


Chapter Fourteen

The Mongol Yuan
and the Manchu Qing Rule over
East Asian Continent

The Last Phase of Tripolar East Asia



Ming Boundary
Blunden and Elvin (1998: 94)



Qing Willow Palisade
Qingdai Liu-tiao-bian 清代柳條邊
楊樹森, 遼寧省: 人民出版社, 1978

¹ See Franke and Twitchett (1994: 329).

舊唐書 卷一百九十九下 列傳 北狄
室韋者 契丹之別類也...東至黑水靺
鞨 西至突厥 南接契丹...其國無君
長...而附于突厥 兵器有角弓楛矢尤
善射 時聚弋獵 事畢而散...畜宜犬
豕...大室韋部落...傍望建河居 其河
源出突厥東北界...屈曲東流...又東經
蒙兀室韋之北...忽汗河合 又東經南
黑水靺鞨之北...東流注于海

唐書 卷二百一十九下 列傳 北狄
契丹 本東胡種 ...室韋 契丹別種
東胡之北邊...西突厥南契丹 大室韋
...河...河南有蒙瓦部...水東合...忽汗
河 又東貫黑水靺鞨

北史 卷九十四 列傳 第八十二 奚
本曰庫莫奚 其先東部胡宇文之別種
也 初為慕容晁所破...契丹國...與庫
莫奚異種同類 並為慕容晁所破

The name of Mongols appears for the first time in the History of Tang. 蒙兀 is read “*meng-wu*” by the modern-day Chinese, but is read “*mong-ol*” by the modern-day Korean that is, as usual, much closer to the ancient (up to Tang time) reading of “*mong-uə*” in metropolitan China. It may be due to what the anthropologists call the “freezing” phenomena in the periphery. The New Tang-shu writes 蒙瓦 whose ancient reading is “*mong-uär*” and modern reading is “*meng-wa*.”

According to Grousset (1970: 193), “we should reckon among the Mongolian-speaking peoples the Xianbei of the

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

THE MONGOL YUAN AND THE MANCHU QING RULE OVER EAST ASIAN CONTINENT

THE LAST PHASE OF TRIPOLAR EAST ASIA

1. The Mongolian Nomads Defeating the Manchurian Conquest Dynasty: The Mongols Co-opt the Turks to Rule over “All under Heaven”

MACHURIAN WOODSMEN METAMORPHOSED INTO MONGOLIAN NOMADS

The co-existence of the Han dynasty and the Xiongnu empire was followed by the conquest of North China by the Manchurian Touba-Xianbei. The co-existence of Sui-Tang dynasties and the (Uighur) Turkic empire was followed by the occupation of North China by the Manchurian Qidans and Ruzhens. The Qidans originated from the Yu-wen Xianbei of the Western Manchurian steppe, and the Ruzhens from the Sushen-Mohe of the Eastern Manchurian forest. The appearance of Chinggis Khan in Mongolia apparently produced an entirely new situation in which a united Mongolian steppe empire confronted not a Han Chinese dynasty, but a Manchurian conquest dynasty of Ruzhen Kin in North China.

The Chinggis Khan’s Mongol tribe was the *Meng-wu* (Mongol) branch of a larger ethnic grouping known to the Chinese as the *Shi-wei*. According to the Old Tang-shu, the *Shi-wei* were a branch of the Qidan, the descendents of Yuwen-Xianbei. The Xianbei once had occupied the northern Xiongnu territories after the demise of the Xiongnu empire at the

end of the first century, as well as in the late second century under the leadership of Tan Shi-hua. According to Grousset (1970: 193), the proto-Mongol peoples included the Xianbei, Jou-jan, Ye-tai, Avars, and the Qidan, and “although many of these ‘proto-Mongol’ peoples founded vast dominions, not one achieved such worldwide fame as the Mongols proper, or Chinggis-kahanites.”¹

A-bao-ji, the founder of the Qidan Liao, led a great expedition into northern Mongolia, reaching the old Uighur capital city on the Orkhon River in 924-5. According to Grousset (1970: 128), A-bao-ji offered to allow the Uighur Turks, who had settled in the western Gansu corridor, to reoccupy the Orkhon region, but the Uighurs, “having adopted sedentary ways, rejected the idea of a return to nomadic life.” Perhaps by taking advantage of the power vacuum on the steppes or simply by being pushed out by A-bao-ji, the Chinggis Khans’s Mongol tribe migrated from their original homeland in the forests of the Lesser Xing’an Range in northern Manchuria to the Argun River area sometime during the tenth century, and then finally settled at the Onon-Kerulen area in the eleventh century, the later days of the Qidan Liao dynasty (907-1125), transforming themselves into full-time nomads.² They were a new face, and had no supratribal leadership of their own on the Mongolian steppe.

Chinggis’ great-grandfather, Khabul, founded the first Mongolian state, and the Kin court (1115-1234) tried to bring the Mongols into their tributary network. According to Franke and Twitchett (ibid: 15), the family of Chinggis was at one time frontier feudatories of the Ruzhen Kin. Chinggis Khan was born (c. 1167) into a ruling clan, but did not owe his power to election, and rose to the leadership of a great nomadic empire from an extremely marginal position. His bitter experiences with fickle tribal politics full of treachery shaped his military strategy and political organization.³ The ethnonym Mongol that was originally peculiar to a small Qidan tribe of Xianbei provenance was elevated above other tribes by Chinggis Khan, resulting in an ethnonymic unification over the entire Mongolian steppe. According to Janhunen (1996: 160), “the linguistic Mongolization of Mongolia had ... taken place during the more than three centuries that separated the fall of

third century, the Jou-jan and Ye-tai of the fifth, and the Avars of Europe (sixth to ninth century),” and “it has also been recognized that the Qidan, who played so great a part from the eighth to the twelfth century, spoke a Mongol dialect which, however, by contact with the Tungusic languages, had become strongly palatalized.”

後漢書 卷九十 烏桓鮮卑列傳 第八十...桓帝時 鮮卑檀石槐者...東却夫餘 西擊烏孫 盡據匈奴故地

魏書 卷一百三 列傳 第九十一 蠕蠕 東胡之苗裔...自號柔然...太祖九年 [394] ...凶勢益...其西北有匈奴餘種...於是自號丘豆伐可汗

A Mongol tribe called Ye-tai, initially Jou-jan’s vassal, came down from the Altai region to present-day Turkestan. By about 440, they came to occupy Sogdiana, Transoxiana, Bactria and eastern Iran. In the early sixth century, the Ye-tai rulers firmly entrenched themselves on both sides of the Hindu Kush, in Bactria and Kabul, replacing the last Kushan rulers. They dwelt in felt tents, ruined the Greco-Buddhic civilization of Gandhara, and played Attila of India from their Punjab base camp between 502-30, but then somehow vanished from history. See Grousset (1970: 67-72).

A band of Mongol stock called Avars in European history, either the descendants of the Jou-jan or Yeta tribes, reached Europe and, acting as confederates of the Byzantine Empire

between 557-565, destroyed the Hunnic kingdoms founded by the descendants of Attila's people.

They occupied Hungary, possibly introducing the stirrup into the West, and reigned from the Volga to Austria until subjugated by Charlemagne in 805. The Avar khagan was baptized with the name of Theodore. See Grousset (1970: 175-8)

² Franke and Twitchett (1994: 329-33) give a summary of this ethnogenesis. Sometime during the tenth century the Mongol component of the *Shi-wei* began a movement westward toward the Argun River, where they became subjects of the Qidan, to whom they were linguistically related. They continued their migrations and finally established themselves in the Onon-Kerulen area during the eleventh century. Their part-time, limited pastoralism in the northern Manchurian forests gave way to full-time steppe pastoralism. According to the History of Liao, A-bao-ji mounted attacks on the Shi-wei in 901, 904, 905, 907, 908, and 909.

³ See Barfield (1989: 188).

⁴ See Grousset (1970: 255, 393). The Batu's khanate of Kipchak, with its capital at the lower Volga near the Caspian in the midst of subjugated Kipchak Turks, was to be known to history as the Golden Horde (Altan-or-do). These Mongolian rulers in Europe survived as unassimilated

the Uighur (840) and the proclamation of the Mongol Khanate (1206)."

The Mongol empire established by Chinggis Khan of Mongol-Shiwei provenance (in other words, Qidan-Xianbei provenance) eventually confronted the Ruzhen Kin of Eastern Manchurian woodsmen. In fact, the Shi-wei had also led the life of typical woodsmen. According to Franke and Twitchett (1994: 329), the homeland of Shi-wei was the area south of the Amur River in the general vicinity of the Lesser Xing'an Range, and the Shi-wei eked out a meager existence through a combination of primitive agriculture, pig raising, hunting, fishing, and pastoralism. A branch of these Manchurian woodsmen had metamorphosed into Mongolian nomads within a couple of hundred years.

Janhunen (1996: 158) contends that "if we accept the hypothesis that the Qidan were linguistically related to the Mongols, we see that the political history of Manchuria involves a regular oscillation of the power between Mongolic and Tungusic elements."

THE MONGOLS CO-OPT TURKS FOR EMPIRE BUILDING

From 89-93, a combined force of Xianbei, southern Xiong-nu, and Later Han armies had routed the northern Xiong-nu, causing the western migration of a large number of northern Xiong-nu from Mongolia all the way to the southern Russian steppes. The remaining northern Xiong-nu were then ruled temporarily by the Xianbei. The Xiong-nu is believed to have been the ancestor of the Turks. The Jou-jan Mongols were able to establish a centralized state under the leadership of She-lun (r. 402-10), but were crushed and superseded by the Turks in 552. According to the History of Northern Wei, the Jou-jans were descendants of the Eastern Hu, meaning the Xianbei. Before Chinggis Khan (r. 1206-27) united the Mongol tribes in 1206, most of Mongolia had been occupied by the Turks. In the early seventh century, some Turkish tribes had fled west under attack by Tai-zong of Tang (626-49). Now under the combined pressure of both the Mongols and Manchurian dynasties (Liao and Kin), most Turks still remaining on the Mongolian steppes were once again forced to decamp towards Central and West Asia, unintentionally

opening the route for the Mongol conquest of Eurasia and paving the steppe turnpikes for the trans-continental Mongol empire.

A nomadic conqueror always tried to draw under his banners all sorts of nomads he was able to collect on his way to conquest. The purely Mongolian component of Chinggis Khan's army amounted to less than 130,000 at the time of his death. Batu (r. 1227-55) could successfully wage the European campaigns of 1236-41, occupy the whole of ancient Scythia, including steppes north of the Black Sea and Caucasus, and also enforce suzerainty over the Russian principalities, leading less than 4,000 pure-blooded Mongol troops (that were allocated specifically to him by Chinggis Khan's dying wish), only by mobilizing the Turks that had settled in those regions a long time ago.⁴

The Mongols tried to incorporate all ethnic groups that submitted without fighting into their armies and government. A surrendered Song commander, for instance, helped the Mongols in the construction of a river fleet, expediting the conquest of southern China full of rivers, canals, and streams. Many former Song troops (termed newly-adhered armies) were either organized into new units with Mongols or Northern Chinese (including Qidan, Ruzhen and Koreans) as their officers, or were incorporated into the existing Yuan ranks.⁵ The surrendered peoples were obliged to provide auxiliary troops to assist the Mongolian siege and blockading operations. The Uighur Turks in East Turkestan were the first of the Turkic peoples to submit peacefully to the Mongols, thereby providing the Mongols with vital administrative and managerial skills. The Mongols effectively co-opted the Turkic peoples for their empire building.

Chinggis Khan had completely reorganized the tribal or clan armies, united only in a fluid association, into a more rigid hierarchical force. A tribe or clan exceeding a thousand fighters was divided into several units (*Ming-an*) of 1,000, while the *Ming-an* with a smaller number of fighters was filled by assembling kinsmen who had been scattered in other clans or tribes, or even by co-opting war captives. All male adults between fifteen and seventy years of age were liable for military service when needed. Each unit was assigned grazing

foreigners encamped on European soil until 1502, long after the Chinggis khanites had been driven out of China, Persia and Turkestan. Tamerlane (1336-1405) declared himself the heir and continuator of Chinggis Khan and Chagatai, but he belonged to a Turkic aristocratic clan in Transoxiana. He was brought into the great Chinggis khanite family only by marriage in 1397. The Timurid epic conquests were executed by the Turkic forces that were born of Chinggis khanite military discipline.

⁴ See Hsiao (1978: 15-6, 74, 174).

In addition to the core Mongol army, there also appeared the Newly-adhered (former Song) army, the Ruzhen army, the Qidan army, the Korean army (of Shen-yang), and others.

元史 卷九十八 志第四十六 兵 一
…其繼得宋兵 號新附軍 又有遼東
之亂軍 契丹軍 女直軍 高麗軍 …

⁵ Hsiao (1978: 14, 25)



14.1. A Mongol Hunter

⁷ See Hsiao (1978: 33-39).

The Tai-zu of the Northern Song dynasty had designated all the elite troops, including the offspring of politically privileged families, as the Imperial Guard (divided into a couple of mutually independent contingents to provide a counter-balance) and also kept about half of them in the capital region, effectively ensuring the loyalty of influential families and discouraging the regional uprising and usurpation of the throne.

⁸ According to Jagchid and Symons (1989: 19-20), "Chinggis (r. 1206-27) sought and failed to sustain trade and tribute arrangements with the Kin which would have enabled him to obtain essential goods from China. Once exchange institutions were closed to him, Chinggis's only alternative was war. ... The interest of Chinggis in securing goods rather than territory or political power is apparent by his activities in 1213 when he entered the North China plain and besieged Zhongdu (Beijing). After receiving bounteous gifts from the court and plundering the countryside, he returned home. To this point in his career, Chinggis had no designs to occupy land, but rather sought booty to reward his followers. ...

However, as early as 1236, as evidenced by the following dialogue between the Qidan scholar-advisor to the Mongolian court ..., the [Mongol] policy began to change. Ye-lü Chu-cai admonished Ögödei Khan: ... The court should appoint officials to collect the tax

land, and the families were also put under the same administration. The hereditary chieftains, however, constituted an officer corps rather than a feudal aristocracy. The chieftains exacted levies from the self-sufficient military families under their jurisdiction and also depended on the spoils acquired in campaigns. After the founding of the Yuan dynasty, officers became a hereditary salaried aristocracy.⁶

Chinggis Khan created the Imperial Guard from among the sons and younger brothers of commanders of proven loyalty, the offspring of aristocratic families all over Mongolia, and the royal hostages offered by surrendered kings to serve as his own bodyguard and also as personal domestic staff of imperial household. It was a hostage camp, an academy for young aristocrats promised a future of prominent official positions, a form of privileged apprenticeship for the future ruling class, a key link in maintaining Khan's personal relationship with aristocracy and, at the same time, a rudimentary executive organ to transform the loose confederation of nomadic chieftains into a centralized autocratic despotism.⁷

PAX-MONGOLIANA

The Xiong-nu and Uighur Turks had traditionally pursued the strategy of extortion against the Han Chinese dynasties. The conquest of mainland China did not, at first, appear to have been a primary goal of Chinggis Khan either.⁸ Unlike the Han Chinese courts, however, the Manchurian Kin court flatly refused the Mongol demands that the emperor accept Chinggis Khan as his sovereign and that Shaanxi be evacuated. Instead of yielding to extortions (in the traditional Chinese fashion), they fought the Mongols until the dynasty was itself completely destroyed. The last Kin emperor killed himself in a beleaguered city.

When the Mongol army seized Liao-yang in 1212 and 1215, the Qidans rebelled against the Ruzhen Kin. This fact may indicate that the Ruzhens could not successfully co-opt the Qidan-Xianbei people into their rank after the fall of the Liao dynasty. The Ruzhens who later founded the Manchu Qing empire perhaps reflected on their past conduct, and apparently did not repeat the same mistake. They successfully co-opted

the Mongols for their empire building, and the Mongols remained as a faithful ally of the Manchus until the very end.


The Han Chinese had been able to maintain their cultural and political integrity in the south when they confronted the Tuoba-Xianbei Wei, Qidan Liao, and Ruzhen Kin from Manchuria. When they confronted the Xiong-nu and Uighur Turks in the Mongolian steppe, the Han Chinese were able to hold on to North China, by paying tributes. The Song rulers mistook the Mongols for just another (peace-by-tribute) Xiong-nu, and collaborated with the Mongols in crushing the Manchurian Kin dynasty in 1234. Grossly underestimating their Mongol adversaries, the Song forces further attempted to recover territories in the North that the Ruzhen Kin had seized in 1126, thereby provoking the wrath of Mongol rulers. The Mongols, unlike the Xiong-nu, were the global conqueror with aspirations to rule over “All under Heaven,” and hence completely wiped out the Chinese dynasty. The feat of conquering the entire territory of the Han Chinese state was belatedly emulated by the Ruzhen Qing from Manchuria.

The Mongols conquered the Western Xia in 1227, the Kin in 1234, Korea in 1259 and the Southern Song in 1279. According to Janhunen (1996: 134), “none of the Mongol conquests in East Asia was easy, for their military actions lasted 20 years against the Western Xia (1207-27), 24 against the Kin (1210-34), 40 against Korea (1219-59), and 44 against the Song (1235-79).” Chenggis Khan died on his final campaign against the Western Xia. The Mongols commenced their drive against the Kin in 1209, and captured the Kin capital in 1215, but it took another nineteen years to conquer the Kin dynasty (in 1234).

The secret weapon of the Mongolian army was nothing more but its mobility, discipline, and maneuverability, together with effective coordination acquired from tribal hunting expeditions. The Mongols had deliberately adopted the terror tactic of massacre to obtain prompt submission and prevent rebellion. They burned down cities and destroyed farm fields to convert them into steppe. In Eastern Iran, four-fifths of the population was slaughtered. The Mongol barbarity was born of ignorance of sedentary civilization.⁹ After the conquest of the Kin in 1234, however, the Mongols had time

and distribute it to [the nobles] by the end of the year, and not allow them to freely extort from the people. ...”

⁹ Franke and Twitchett (1994: 36) note that: “...in their conquest of northern China they wreaked havoc and destruction on settled populations on the same scale as they had done in Iran, Russia, and northern India.”



14.2. Mongol and Song cavalry fighting a battle in a mountain pass.

¹⁰ Franke and Twitchett (1994: 639)

¹¹ Beijing region (the capital city area of the ancient Yan Kingdom, Yan-jing) had been a garrison city that was made Nan-jing (Southern Capital) by the Liao to serve as the administrative center for the conquered Han Chinese land. The Kin ruled from Beijing, now called Zhong-du (Central Capital), and then

the Mongols made it Great Metropolis, Dadu 大都. Kai-feng in Henan was the capital of the Northern Song, and Hangzhou in Zhe-jiang was the capital of the Southern Song.

¹² See Fairbank and Goldman (1992: 122-123). Hsiao (1978: 3) notes that: "They tended to think in military terms and never made any serious attempt to rule China in traditional Chinese fashion."

The necessity to maintain more than 150,000 troops garrisoned in arid Inner Asia exhausted the Yuan dynasty. See also Hsiao (1978: 57-60).

¹³ The descendants of the generals inherited the offices from generation to generation. See Hsiao (1978: 26-7). The Mongol soldiers were ill adapted to farming life, and their families suffered from the chronic absence of male adults and exploitation by corrupt military superiors. The solidarity between the impoverished military households and their superiors disappeared. The Ruzhen soldiers of the preceding Kin dynasty had been allocated land in North China and been able to lead, with difficulty to be sure, a decent agricultural life to support their military duties, as did the bannermen of the Qing much later. Why were the Mongolian soldiers utterly unable to make a decent living on Chinese land? Hsiao (1978: 20) answers this question in this way: "we must bear in mind that the Ruzhen and Manchus had some agricultural experience before they

to collect many civilized advisors and to learn the art of ruling an empire in the North China plain that was already well experienced in alien domination. Khubilai (r. 1260-94), the grandson of Chinggis, was able to declare himself the emperor of Yuan (1206-1368) in 1271, eight years prior to the final extinction of the Southern Song.

The Uighur Turks had submitted peacefully to Chenggis Khan who referred to the Uighur ruler as his fifth son. The Mongols adopted the Uighur script for their written language. Ledyard (1983: 348) notes: "It may have been simply a historical accident that Uighur literary influence, Central Asian administrative and governing techniques, and Christian and Islamic religious currents penetrated Mongol life before Chinese practices did, but the effect was to provide the Mongols with many services and techniques that insulated them from the need to seek similar things from China. And when the Mongols did become closely associated with Chinese life, it was not the only form of higher civilization they had encountered, and they were therefore less susceptible to its lure." The Mongol Yuan did not institute the civil service examinations until 1315, and then on a very small scale.¹⁰

Khubilai Khan transferred his capital from Karakorum in Mongolia to Beijing in 1271.¹¹ The Yuan was the first foreign dynasty to conquer and rule all of China. The Mongols were garrisoned at key points. They used Uighur, Tibetans, Turks, Arabs, and sinicized Ruzhens in government offices. Manchuria, Mongolia, Turkestan and Tibet were placed under administrative systems different from those employed in mainland China below the Great Wall.¹²

All the Turko-Mongol nations were unified into a single empire. From Manchuria to the Caspian, an iron discipline was imposed in order to ensure the unmolested travel of caravans. More than two hundred thousand horses were distributed among the relay stations in service of the imperial mails. Khubilai was not only the emperor of China, but in theory the khan of the entire Mongol empire of Chinggis-khanite apanages, realizing the Pax Mongoliana.

THE MONGOLS RESISTING SINIFICATION

The Mongol rulers resisted sinification by conducting

their business in the Mongol language, living in tents erected on the palace grounds, spending their summers in Mongolia, and maintaining the tradition of choosing the emperors through bloody competition. Khubilai Khan discouraged Mongols from marrying Chinese, and he himself took only Mongol women into the palace. The Han Chinese, on the other hand, were not forced to adopt the conqueror's customs.

With the lapse of time, however, the fighting capacity of the Mongol military households began to lose every vestige of their vigor.¹³ After the annihilation of the Southern Song, the Yuan was at peace for a long time and the people did not know war. In garrison communities, not only Confucian learning but also marriage with Chinese women became common. The Mongol court and nobility were divided, and engaged deeply in succession struggles, each contender striving to control the Imperial Guard that functioned like the Roman praetorian cohorts. By the 1350s, the Han Chinese rebellion raged all over the country.

After the collapse of the Yuan dynasty, the Mongol rulers simply fled with their troops, founding the Northern Yuan in their old homelands.¹⁴ It may be surprising to learn that the first emperor of the Northern Yuan was half Korean.

2. Koryeo Yielding to the Stronger and Preserving Its Dynastic Existence

In Koryeo, a group of discontented military generals had revolted in 1170, purged a large number of arrogant civilian aristocrats, and enthroned a new king, commencing a century of military rule. They chastised the king for allowing the abuses practiced by the aristocratic families and the Buddhist establishment. The military rulers later fell as an aftermath to the Mongol invasions.

When the Ruzhen Kin came under sustained Mongol attack, the Qidan asserted their independence, but pressure from the Mongols drove them into Koryeo territory (in 1216).¹⁵ The Mongol-Koryeo coalition forces destroyed the Qidan in 1219, but after this incident the Mongols demanded from the Koryeo court heavy annual tribute. The Koryeo

entered China — which was certainly not the case with most if not all the Mongols.”

¹⁴ See Janhunen (1996: 166).

Ledyard (1983: 326) notes: “while most Qidan and Ruzhen residents of Chinese areas simply blended into the landscape when their regimes came to an end, the Mongols were still very much Mongols when the Yuan dynasty's days ran out.”

¹⁵ See Lee (1984: 148).

¹⁶ The first Mongol invasion force (of October 1274) amounted to 25,000 Mongol and Han Chinese soldiers, 8,000 Koryeo soldiers, and 900 ships with 6,700 Koryeo sailors aboard. The second Mongol invasion force (of May 1281) amounted to 3,500 ships and 100,000 soldiers who sailed from South China, and 900 ships and 40,000 soldiers (that included 10,000 Koryeo soldiers and 900 ships with 15,000 Koryeo sailors aboard) who left from a Korean port.

¹⁷ In the century that followed, seven Mongol princesses were married into the Koryeo royal family, and the offspring of three of these unions held the throne. See Henthorn (1972: 123). The crown princes resided in Beijing until called to the kingship, taking Mongol names and wearing the Mongol hair style. After May 1274, the Mongol generals encountering the Koryeo king began to observe the protocol for an emperor's son-in-law.

The Koryeo court sent marmots, otters, silver, falcons, ceramics, and medicines as tributes, and Kubilai reciprocated with lavish gifts, permitted Koryeo merchants to trade in China, supplied the Koryeo with grain and meat in time of distress, and sent the Mongol troops to oust the rebel forces. See Franke and Twitchett (1994: 436-7).

¹⁸ A cadet branch of the Koryeo royal family was given appointments as governors of the Liao-yang area to govern the large Korean communities there. Twice, when the title passed to princes who were not in line for the throne, the Liao-yang Korean community served as a base to support their aspiration to the throne of Koryeo. Later Koryeo monarchs were given honorary control of the Liao-yang area and invested with the title of “King of Shen-yang 瀋王.” See Henthorn (1972: 123).

¹⁹ 元史 卷一百一十四 后妃一 完者忽都皇后奇氏 高麗人 生皇太子愛猷識理達臘...初...進為宮女...立為第二皇后 初奇氏之族在高麗者 怙勢驕橫 高麗王怒 盡殺之 [至正] 二十三年 后謂皇太子曰 汝何不為復讎耶? 遂立高麗王族人留京師者為王...用兵一萬...過鴨綠水 伏兵四起 乃大敗 餘十七騎而還 后大慚...二十五年...皇后崩...后宜正位中宮 帝不答...二十八年 [1968] 從帝北奔

新元史 卷二百四十九 列傳 第一 百四十六 外國一 高麗 至正 十三年 [1353] 冊立皇太子...太子奇皇后

military rulers, however, refused to pay tribute on several occasions, inviting thereby a series of Mongol invasions beginning in 1231. Ordering peasantry to keep fighting in the mountain fortresses, the Koryeo military rulers, entrenched in the Kang-wha Island, stubbornly resisted the Mongols for almost 30 years until the Koryeo’s eventual surrender in 1259 under the new civilian leadership that replaced the military rulers.

Ledyard (1983: 325) notes: “The territory of the Yuan dynasty ... combined that of Kin and Song, so that Manchuria was wholly joined with China and placed under the same administration. ... Koryeo was able to preserve its dynastic existence ... although ... Koryeo’s northern territory ... was removed and placed under the direct Mongol administration ... was returned to Koryeo control in 1290, and ... in 1356.”

To support the Mongol campaigns against the Kamakura shogunate on the Japanese islands in 1274 and 1281, the Koryeo constructed hundreds of warships and provided the necessary soldiers, sailors, and provisions. The two invasions, however, ended in complete disaster because of heavy storms.¹⁶

In February 1270, shortly after the Koryeo’s surrender to the Mongols, the king and crown prince had an audience with Kubilai Khan (r. 1260-94). Kubilai decided in August 1271 to betroth his daughter to the crown prince, and the wedding took place in May 1274. The crown prince ascended the throne in July 1274, to be called King Chung-yul (1274-1308). Thereafter a succession of Koryeo kings had princesses of the Yuan imperial house as their primary consorts, ensuring a slow but sure genetic conquest of stubborn Koryeo rulers.¹⁷

As a son-in-law nation to Yuan, the Koryeo court could maintain its position as sovereign ruler of an independent state.¹⁸ Genetically, however, the Koryeo kings rapidly converged to the pure blooded Mongol princes. Seemingly a retaliation of sorts, Koryeo exported a woman to become in 1340 the second empress, called Empress Ki, of the last Yuan Emperor (Shun-di, r. 1333-68, d. 1370). According to Dardess (1994: 580), in view of “the effect of her new status on the complex issue of Yuan relations with Korea,” many Mongols had opposed to making her second empress. She gave

birth to the Prince Imperial who was installed as heir apparent in 1353 and ascended the throne of Northern Yuan (1368-91) in 1370.

During the 14th century, the Koryeo aristocratic ruling class greatly expanded their holdings of private lands and slaves, depleting state revenues. On the other hand, the raids of *Waegu*, the seaborne Japanese marauders on the Korean peninsula, became rampant after 1350, appearing anywhere at any time. The Muromachi shogunate (1338-1573) lacked the power to constrain the *Waegu*. A Koryeo general named Choe Yeong, however, together with Yi Seong-gye, succeeded in destroying these pirates. In 1356, Koryeo had sent an army to attack the Yuan commandery headquarters at Ssang-seong, Ham-gyeong province. The cooperation of Yi Ja-chun, who was a local magnate and father of Yi Seong-gye, had played a decisive role for Koryeo to recover its lost territory.

Although King Kong-min (1351-74) had a Mongol wife and a Mongol mother, he purged the pro-Yuan faction, eliminating Empress Ki's brother, who came to exercise mighty power in the Koryeo court; abolishing the Yuan liaison organ, the Eastern Expedition Field Headquarters; and recovering Koryeo's lost territory by attacking the Yuan commandery in 1356, the year Zhu Yuan-zhang claimed himself King of Wu. Eight years thereafter, Empress Ki at last managed to persuade the Prince Imperial to send an army and replace the King Kong-min, but the Mongol force was annihilated in 1364, marking the end of Mongol power in the Korean peninsula. The Mongols soon abandoned mainland China and, in 1368, fled back to their old homelands.¹⁹

When the family of the Empress Ki assembled Yuan refugees in Manchuria in 1368 with the intention of avenging the downfall of their clique, "King Kong-min dusted off the tradition that Koryeo was the successor to the old state of Koguryeo and thus the rightful sovereign of Manchuria and sent two of his best generals, Chi Yongsu and Yi Seong-gye, into Manchuria. Yi Seong-gye (1335-1408) was the fifth-generation scion of a military family which had for three generations held the post of Chief of One Thousand in the Korean northeast. ... While Yi Seong-gye swept north through the Ham-heung plains, General Chi drove west toward Liao-

所出也 奇氏高麗人本微賤...皇后兄子奇轍爲大司徒富貴震一時..十六年 [1356] 有密告奇轍潛通 雙城叛民謀逆祺殺之夷其族...二十三年 皇太子欲爲奇皇后復仇 乃立德興君...爲國王...發遼陽行省兵送之...祺聞其事...書曰 世祖皇帝...釐降帝女於忠烈王且許以不革國俗 以至於今...二十四年 [1364]...以大兵一萬圍義州爲崔瑩等所敗 一軍皆沒


新元史 卷二十六 本紀 惠宗四 至正二十四年 春正月 [1364] 是月 崔帖木兒與高麗人戰於定州敗績...三十年 [1370] 惠宗崩於應昌 皇太子卽皇帝位...改元宣光...宣光元年 明太祖洪武四年也 [1371] 遼陽行省...降於高麗 十月 高麗兵陷五老山寨...二年 [1372]... 大破明...兵於嶺北自是明兵不復渡漠



14.3. King Kongmin and Mongol Queen

In 1365, the beloved Mongol queen of Kong-min died in childbirth. It is said that the King, afraid to ride horseback, was taught horseriding in the palace by the Mongol queen. The king painted a portrait of his queen and sat in the

shrine facing the portrait night and day engulfed in sorrow. A Buddhist monk named Sin Don abused the trust of the lonely helpless king. Both Sin Don and Kong-min were killed in 1374, and the leader of a strong clan seized the government, putting on the throne the 10-year old son of Kong-min (King U, 1374-88) born from a palace slave girl. King U and his 9-year old son, King Chang (1388-89), were both deposed by Yi Seong-gye who later murdered the last Koryeo King (Kong-yang, 1389-92).



14.4. King Kong-min Hunting

²⁰ The Koryeo army mobilized at the time amounted to 38,830 soldiers and 11,600 auxiliaries, but it was officially called a 100,000-man army. It seems that the usual exaggeration ratio was about 2 to 3 in those days.

²¹ Neo-Confucianism was based on the ideas of Zhu-xi (1130-1200) of Southern Song to recreate the political order as exemplified by such sage rulers as Yao and Shun, and the founders of the Xia, Shang, and Zhou.

dong and took the city of Liao-yang [in November 1370]. The Koreans were unprepared to hold their gains and recalled their armies, although they repeatedly brought up their claim to all lands east of the Liao River. Ming forces soon moved into the area, permanently settling the question (Henthorn, 1972: 129)."

Ledyard (1983: 326-7) notes that: "The Mongol rulers ... maintained themselves as 'Northern Yuan' for several decades after 1368 and were not definitely driven from the Liao area until 1387. The lingering of the northern Yuan presented the rulers of Koryeo with extensive problems. Some conservative forces ... managed to promote ... diplomatic relationship with them; for their part, the Northern Yuan forces kept on the best terms they could manage with Koryeo as a support for their position in Manchuria. ... the Ming armies finally took over the Liao-yang area in 1387..."

3. Rise of the Chosun Dynasty (1392-1910)

As the professed successor to Koguryeo, Koryeo previously claimed all lands east of the Liao River. The new Ming dynasty (1368-1644), however, proclaimed in 1388 its intention to occupy even the northeastern frontier area of Koryeo that had been administered under the Yuan commandery. Resenting this proclamation, Choe Yeong (who had just seized power by driving out the rival faction) decided to invade Liao-dong, appointing Yi Seong-gye as deputy commander. Yi, however, turned his army back at Wi-wha Island (in the mouth of Yalu River), and seized power.²⁰

The reform-minded Neo-Confucian scholar-officials used the military strongman, Yi Seong-gye, to put their ideas into practice. Yi Seong-gye ruled indirectly through the puppet Koryeo kings for four years, and then established a new dynasty, justifying this in the name of the Mencian concept of Heavenly Mandate, and setting up the structure of government and society according to Confucian ideals.²¹

The Chosun retained the cis-Yalu territory, but gave up the Liao River basin in order to maintain good relations with the Ming. Many Ruzhens joined the Yi garrisons established in the vicinity of the Yalu, and others entered trade,

frequently assuming Korean surnames (see Crossly, 1999, p. 87). The Chosun court accepted the suzerain-subject relationship with the Ming. Yi Seong-gye had already adopted a friendly posture toward Ming, aborting the invasion of Liaodong in 1388 and overthrowing the Koryeo dynasty in 1392. By adhering to the traditional *Sa-dae* (Respect the Greater) strategy, the Koreans yielded to the Stronger, now the Han Chinese Ming, and the Chosun dynasty was able to retain cis-Yalu territory, maintain its independent nationhood free from the ravages of warfare, and even obtain the Ming's help in repulsing the Japanese invasion in 1592. Disappointing the irredentists, the rulers of the Korean peninsula chose stability and peace rather than contesting the Liaodong area.

Tae-jong (1400-18) reorganized various military groups under the direct command of the king, and restructured the central government under the State Council. During the reign of Se-jong (1418-50), the northern boundary along the Yalu and Tumen rivers was secured firmly, and *Hangul* (a script) was invented in 1446, enabling the Koreans to write without using Chinese letters for the first time.²² The institutionalization of the new dynasty was finalized by the publication of the State Code (*Kyung-guk-dae-jeon*) in 1485.

Chosun was a highly centralized Neo-Confucian bureaucratic state, the central government appointing all the local officials, and instituting a system of checks and balances (i.e., criticism and surveillance) defined by a statutory national code, designed to prevent the concentration and abuse of power or arbitrary decision-making by the king or any other official. Appointed from the newest graduates of the civil service examination, the court diarists took notes, in "straight brush" for posterity, of all the activities of the king and the officials, obliging them to adhere to the ideals of Zhu-xi's Neo-Confucian norms (see Lee and de Bary, 1997, pp. 261-5, 302).²³

The dynastic founders of both Koryeo and Chosun sought power to restore social justice and relieve the misery of the common people, but every new institutional arrangement was fated to degenerate with the passage of time. As with the beginning of any new dynasty, land was at first fairly distributed to all tillers, the number of slaves drastically reduced, and a rational land-tax system imposed. Gradually,

The conspicuous features of Korean Neo-Confucianism from the late fourteenth century on were anti-Buddhism and moralistic rightness (see Lee and de Bary, 1997, pp. 252, 279-80).

Yi Seong-gye and his successors wiped out the political influence of the Buddhist establishment, discouraged shamanistic practices, reformed the degenerate social systems, set afire all the existing registers of public and private land, implemented an equitable land-holding system, and improved the status of slaves while drastically reducing their number.

²² The pillaging by the Japanese marauders had been drastically reduced by the beginning of the Chosun dynasty. King Se-jong launched an expedition in 1419 against the island of Tsushima to eliminate their base, and then allowed the Japanese to engage in trade at three ports under the strict supervision of Chosun officials. The Chosun court maintained the *Kyōrin* (Neighborly Relations) strategy with the Tokugawa Japan (1603-1868).

²³ The civil service examinations tested knowledge of the Confucian classics. Recently discovered evidence shows that commoners were also allowed to take the examinations. The new ruling class was the meritorious elite people of virtue and talent, who inherited their status as nobility essentially by passing the examinations and securing official

appointment. The official ideology of the Chosun state stressed frugality and thrift in daily life. With progress in agricultural technology made possible by improved seeds, wet-farming and rice transplanting, Chosun commoners were able to live in reasonable security and material comfort.

²⁴ See Fairbank and Goldman (1998: 48-9).

²⁵ Hsiao (1978: 4)

²⁶ Yong-le let the admiral Zheng He, a Muslim Turk undertake seven grand diplomatic naval expeditions between 1405 and 1423, visiting 30 countries as far as the African east coast with 26,800 men in the very first voyage. The shipyards near Nan-jing alone built 2,000 vessels, including about 100 state-of-the-art treasure ships unprecedented in human history; 370-440 feet in length and 150-180 feet abeam, weighing 3,000 tons apiece with 4-9 masts up to 90 feet high, 16 water-tight compartments, and stern-post rudders. Persuaded by the Confucian-trained bureaucrats, Yong-le's successors prohibited foreign contact and trade altogether, letting the Zheng He's Armada rot in shipyards and leaving the world to be explored by Europeans. See Fairbank and Goldman (1992: 137-8).

²⁷ See Barfield (1989: 235-7).

²⁸ Jagchid and Symons (1989: 139-40) states: "Yearly payments were received

however, the ruling class increased their land-holdings and exempted them from taxation. Furthermore, they took small farmers under their wing as clients who paid less to them than to the state, causing a greater burden on the still-taxable land of the peasantry.²⁴

After having been founded with fresh vigor and a strong sense of justice, a dynasty is bound to degenerate within one or two hundred years. In mainland China, the average span of a dynastic life was approximately 200 years, and dynastic changes were effected mostly between the Mongol-Manchurian conquerors and native Han Chinese leaders. The length of successive dynasties in the Korean peninsula -- that is, 475 years for Koryeo and 519 years for Chosun following the 992-year Silla dynasty -- is unparalleled in world history.

4. Restoration of the Han Chinese Dynasty: Ming

Zhu Yuan-zhang (r. 1368-98) was a peasant who had obtained literacy from Buddhist priests. Rising as a rebel warlord in the lower Yang-zi region, he succeeded to establish the Ming dynasty (1368-1644). He had stationed his sons in the northern border territories as fiefs, while keeping only the heir designate in the capital, Nan-jing. The oldest son Yong-le (r. 1402-24), who was a popular and experienced frontier military commander, killed the boy emperor and then transferred the capital to his former princely fief, Beijing.

The Ming maintained the Yuan system of decimal military organization, and also the system of hereditary military families, amounting to 2 million units.²⁵ In 1409, Yong-le sent a force of 100,000 troops to attack the Eastern Mongols. Yong-le himself marched with 500,000 troops in 1410 and destroyed the Eastern Mongols. He organized an army for a campaign against Oirat Mongols in 1414, and won a victory at the Kerulen River by firing cannons against the nomads.²⁶

Yong-le had mounted another major campaign against the Eastern Mongols in 1422, and led his fifth steppe campaign in 1424, the last Ming expedition on the steppe. He died en route to Beijing. Yong-le's exploits may be compared to those of Qin Shi-huang-di, Han Wu-di, and Tang Tai-zong. His

successors, however, had absolutely no taste for renewing steppe campaigns. Han campaigns on the steppe against the Xiong-nu were successful only while Wu-di was on the throne. Tang Tai-zong succeeded in obtaining temporary control of the steppe, but his militant policies were dismantled in favor of a passive defense under the reigns of his successors. After Yong-le's death, the Ming court also reverted to the more traditional pattern of fixed defenses.²⁷ The Ming army was made largely self-supporting by allotting farm land to soldiers' families. The reinforcement of the Great Wall was an expression of the siege mentality of the Ming court that proved to be a futile effort.

For a Manchurian or a Mongolian dynasty, Beijing was ideally located to serve as the dynastic capital because of easy access to tribal troops from Manchuria or the Mongolian steppe. With a vigorous leader like Yong-le, who understood frontier warfare and tribal politics, a northern capital was an asset. But for a Han Chinese court in the absence of Shi-huang-di, Wu-di, Tai-zong or Yong-le, Beijing was a liability. It was remote from the bulk of China's resources and, furthermore, put the court directly on a vulnerable frontier defense line, liable to sudden nomadic attack.

The Ming dynasty did not campaign on the steppe after Yong-le's death, and never directly controlled either the northeast or the northwest frontier regions. Yet it refused to make peace treaties with the nomads.²⁸ According to Barfield (1989: 246-49), the Ming rulers reasoned that the Song court had paid huge subsidies to the Qidan, Ruzhen, and Mongols, only to lose first northern China and then be completely swallowed by the Mongols. They believed that subsidies had simply enhanced the power of nomads, ultimately leading to the destruction of the Song dynasty.

The Ming court, however, belatedly recognized the fact that the subsidies to nomads were cheaper than raising troops or building walls for defense. In 1449, the Ming suffered the embarrassment of Emperor Ying-zong being captured by the Oirat Mongols, recalling the Xiong-nu encirclement of Han Gao-zu in 200 BCE. The Ming peace treaty with the Mongol tribal leaders provided subsidies, trade rights, and titles to every minor chieftain, helping to cement the fragmented political


by the Xiong-nu Shan-yu, Mao-dun, as early as the Han period, which set a precedent for the huge demands made on the Song and Southern Song dynasties by the Qidan Liao, Tangut Xia, and Ruzhen Kin states. Bestowals were also presented throughout these dynastic periods, ... Although bestowals and yearly payments were ... extremely costly to maintain, they did provide Chinese courts with an alternative to expensive and dangerous warfare with their nomadic neighbors."

²⁹ After Yong-le's death, until the fall of Esen in 1454, the Ming were in fact paying tributes to the Mongols. Jagchid and Symons (1989: 138) quote a passage in the *Ming Shi-lu*: "It was impossible to satisfy their desires... The chief of the barbarians ... increased their demands each year. Sometimes they asked for many expensive and luxurious things which we did not have. Even so, the court always tried to give those things to them if they were ready in hand.... The barbarian chief ... if he got ... less than what he asked ... always got very angry..."

³⁰ See Barfield (1989: 235-6 and 251). According to Spence (1990: 26), "the policy of the Ming was to control the Ruzhen by formally defining their territory as a part of China's frontier defensive system, by offering them honorific titles, and by granting them trading privileges.

Crossley (1999: 72-3) notes: "Ruzhen 'tribute' missions to the Ming capital

were actually expeditions for imposing upon the ...Ming court ..., collecting bribes in goods and cash to ensure another year of amicability, and wringing high prices for their horses ... in the legalized extortion that constituted the Ming 'tributary' system with the Ruzhens and the Mongols. Putative tributaries were accustomed to write the court in advance notifying it of their desires, specifying such and such a title (inevitably accompanied, it was understood, by cash payment), so many bolts of silk, and certain items of clothing. ... [M]ore than one headman had brought along his mother to personally collect their booty. The results were further drain on the strained resources of the Ming empire." And yet the Ruzhens harbored all sorts of "grievances" against the "arrogant" Ming rulers.



14.5. Wa Invasion Force at Pusan

structure on the Mongolian steppe.²⁹

The Ming, unlike Yuan, lacked the power to maintain military control over the whole of Manchuria outside Liaodong and a narrow coastal strip of Liao-xi. The Ming court granted honorific titles and tributary benefits to about 200 petty Ruzhen tribal leaders in order to maintain influence in the region and keep them out of the sphere of Koryeo influence.³⁰

Toyotomi Hideyoshi succeeded in unifying all of the Japanese islands by 1590, and then decided to ship the now useless warriors and potential trouble-makers to the Korean peninsula in 1592, declaring that they were on their way to conquer Ming China. The Neo-Confucian Chosun, long dominated by scholar-officials, was utterly unprepared for the invasion. The Ming court dispatched a large expeditionary force to protect its own security and to help Chosun repel the invaders. The ravages inflicted on the Chinese coastal provinces by Japanese pirates after 1358 incurred the ill will of Han Chinese toward the Japanese long before the founding of the Ming dynasty in 1368.

The Japanese land forces had at first swept over nearly the whole peninsula, but they were harassed by guerrilla attacks in the rear while the Japanese navy was thoroughly destroyed by Admiral Yi Sun-sin. The Ming-Chosun coalition forces succeeded in driving out the entire Japanese invasion force by 1598. Spence (1990: 18-19) notes that "since the Ming regarded Korea as a loyal and dependent ally to be protected at all costs, Chinese troops were sent in force to help the hard-pressed Koreans. The war might have continued, at terrible cost to all three countries, had not domestic turmoil in Japan, coupled with effective disruption of Japanese supply lines by the Korean navy, led to the recall of Japanese troops from Korea in 1598."

In the Japanese islands, the Tokugawa clan had defeated the followers of Hideyoshi and established a new military regime. The Tokugawa shogunate (1603-1867) asserted that they had settled scores on behalf of the Korean people, and requested the Chosun court to maintain friendly relations. Even though diplomatic relations with the new ruler of the Japanese islands were restored in 1609, the animosity of the Korean people toward Japan remained alive long thereafter.


Japanese were never permitted to go beyond Pusan, and the shogun was obliged to communicate with the Chosun court either through sporadic Chosun embassies to Edo or through the medium of Tsushima, a Tokugawa island domain that also maintained a semi-tributary relationship with Chosun.

After being saved by the Ming army, the tendency for the Koreans looking toward the Han Chinese Middle Kingdom over the shoulder of their Manchurian cousins was very much amplified.

By the year 1600, on the eve of the dynasty's violent end, the empire of Ming was the most sophisticated of all the nations on earth and its population of some 120 million was larger than that of all European countries combined. Positions in the bureaucracy and the military officer hierarchy were acquired by passing the examinations which were administered at the county, provincial, and capital levels. At the very moment when the Ming culture and arts seemed at the height of their glory, however, the state and economy began to unravel. Those who brought order to the chaos in mainland China were the Ruzhen woodsmen in Eastern Manchuria.

5. Manchurian Woodsmen Conquers the Han Chinese: the Manchus Co-opt the Mongols to Rule over East Asian Continent

The Jian-zhou Ruzhen tribes had been hunting and farming in the region of Changbai-shan north of the river Tuman. Nurhaci (1559-1626), the founder of the Qing dynasty (1616-1911), was the son of a Jian-zhou tribal chieftain (*beile*), who had made marriage alliances with the Hun-lun tribes. The entire lineage of Nurhaci and his ancestor, Mönke Temür, used the Tong surname (descended from the ancient surname "Jiagu," called "Gioro" in Qing times). The general vicinity of Pozhu valley became the base (c. 1436) for the Jian-zhou tribes long before the conquest of Liao-dong by Nurhaci in 1621, and the Pozhu River, a northeasterly tributary of the Hun River that flows to the Yalu River, became the Tung-giya (Tong-jia, the Tong family, in Chinese) River. The area was the original homeland of Koguryeo (Chol-bon Puyeo).³¹



14.6. The Manchu Expansion
Crossley (1999: 131)



14.7. Manchu Indoor Boots
Crossley (1997: 16)

³¹ See Crossley (1996: 74-84). The Ruzhens may be classified into three groups: the Jian-zhou tribes; the detribalized (or “tamed”) Hun-lun tribes farming and trading in the land east of the Liao River and north of Shen-yang (who were trading and mingling with Chinese emigrants, called *Nikan*, in Fushun and Shen-yang that were the heartland of the old Kin empire); and the Savage Ruzhens engaged in fishing, hunting, gathering, and elementary agriculture, further north in the east of the river Mu-dan (up to the Lower Song-hua, Middle Amur, and Ussuri region). Due to the deliberate policy of ethnic relocation, the majority of Wild Ruzhen were relocated and amalgamated into the ethnic core of Jian-zhou tribes. See also Janhunen (1996: 101-6, 157).

³² An excerpt from the memoir of Shin Chung-il recounting his visit in the winter of 1595/6 to Nurhaci’s headquarters at Fe Ala, translated by Crossley (1997: 57, 59). Crossley (1997: 60) notes that Sin’s mission had been to impress upon the Jian-zhou Ruzhens the necessity of observing the integrity of the Northern Chosun border, and not to create a political alliance with Nurhaci against the Ming. The Chosun court used to confer titles and rewards (for being vassals) on the Ruzhen chiefs, and some Ruzhens served in the royal bodyguard. See Peterson (2002: 15).

³³ See Crossley (1999: 85)

On lunar New Year’s Day in 1596, Nurhaci had told Shin Chung-il, an envoy from the Chosun court, that: “From this day forward, our two countries will be as one, our two families will be one, forever united and amicable, for generations, without end.” Nurhaci sent a letter to the Chosun court, saying that: “The honorable Korean country and our Ruzhen nation, we two countries, will advance toward customary good relations, and our two peoples will not habitually raise troops against each other.”³²

In the sixteenth century Manchuria, Chinese-style intensive agriculture was conducted only in the southernmost region below Shen-yang (the modern Muk-den). The Ming rulers had maintained strong garrisons in the Liao River basin under their own generals. Ming military recruitment for service in Liao-dong was surging among Ruzhens and Koreans.³³ Crossley (1999: 47) reiterates Owen Lattimore’s view that the Liaodong-Jilin region prior to the Ming-Qing transition was a “reservoir” in which the fluid elements of Chinese, Mongol, Korean, and native cultures swirled in response to political and economic currents, and that the Ruzhens cum Manchus must have been cultural “chameleons”, like transfrontier or creole, blending alternatively with the Mongols, the Chinese, or the Koreans as advantage dictated. She should have added “the Xianbei-Qidan” also to the list unless she meant to include them in “the Mongols.”

Nurhaci declared himself the Khan of Later Kin in 1616. By 1621, Shen-yang and Liao-yang fell to the Ruzhen troops, and Nurhaci made Shen-yang the capital in 1625. Expeditions to the north also brought the wild forest tribes in Manchuria under control. Tai-zong (Hong Taiji, 1626-43) of the Later Kin had invaded the Korean peninsula in 1627 and extracted silver and cloth from the Chosun court. Tai-zong changed the name of his dynasty to Qing in 1636, invaded Chosun again, and forced the Chosun court to renounce its loyalty to the Ming and accept the suzerain-subject relationship in 1637.

In the preface of *Researches on the Manchu Origins* (*Man-zhou Yuanliu Gao*), the Qian-long emperor (1736-96) states that the ancestors of the Kin imperial clan had lived among the Mohe confederation, within the territory of the ancient Su-

shens where were found the Long White Mountain (*Changbai-shan*) and the Black Water (*Hei-shui*), and this was the very scene of the rise of the Ruzhens, later renamed as Manchus which was presumably a reflex of the Su-shen. The Qing rulers clearly believed that the founders of the Ruzhen Kin dynasty (1115-1234) were their direct ancestors, and hence they initially called their nation Later Kin until 1636.³⁴

REFINING THE TRADITIONAL DUAL SYSTEM

Nurhaci organized his troops and their families into different groups of “banners.” He created four banners in 1601, each of a different color (either yellow, white, blue or red), and appointed four of his kinsmen the lords of these banners. Each of the four banners was split into two in 1616 (the year Nurhaci declared himself the Kahn of the Later Kin), one being the plain banner and the other being bordered. The banners served as identification devices in battle, and membership in a given banner was used as the basis for population registration in daily life.³⁵

Nurhaci also refined the traditional dual system (of the Former Yan, Northern Wei, Liao, Kin and Yuan) with a miniature civil administration in imitation of the Ming government. Educated Chinese who surrendered were offered a chance to serve in the rapidly expanding Ruzhen bureaucracy. Senior Chinese officials who came over to Nurhaci’s side were offered marriage into his family, honorific titles, and high office. The Chinese administrators handled administrative tasks of governing the Liao River basin, without interfering in the military activities of tribal banners. Hong Taiji (Tai-zong) established a new “Manchu” identity, insisting that his lineage sprang from the same root as the Mongols, the Koreans, and all the woodsmen in Manchuria. He drew the civil capacities of an empire and the ideological fundamentals of his claim to rule over mainland China from the Liao-dong Nikans, and declared himself the Emperor of Great Qing in 1636.³⁶

THE CHOSUN RESPECTS THE STRONGER AND SURVIVES

In the Korean peninsula, King Seon-jo (1567-1608) of Chosun was succeeded by Kwang-hae (1608-23) whose skillful foreign policy kept the Korean peninsula from being drawn

³⁴ See Crossley (1997: 124, 301). The emperor Qian-long suggests that the “*Man-chu*” can be traced to the “*Man-zhu*” which in turn can be traced to the “*Zhu-shen*,” which was a fairly recent reflex of the remote name of the “*Su-shen*.”

欽定 滿洲源流考 卷首諭旨
上諭頃閱金史世紀云 金始祖居 完顏部 其地有白山黑水...本朝肇興...與大金正同 史又稱金之先出靺鞨部古肅慎地 我朝肇興時 舊稱滿珠 所屬曰珠申後改稱滿珠 而漢字相沿訛為滿洲 其實即古肅慎為珠申之轉音...我朝得姓曰愛新覺羅氏 國語為金曰愛新 可為金源同派之證

The imperial lineage of the Qing is referred to as the *Aisin Gioro*. *Aisin* means “gold” and this was sufficient proof for the emperor Qian-long that the Qing imperial lineage was a branch of the original Kin Ruzhens.

³⁵ See Spence (1990: 27) and Crossley (1997: 207). About 150 families were organized into a company unit known as “arrow.” Arrow units were combined into groups of about 50 to form regiments, with five regiments to the “banner.” Nurhaci incorporated conquered or surrendered tribal groups into his own arrow-banner supra-tribal army of the hereditary military class. See also Barfield (1989: 253). Nowadays in the People’s Republic of China, each province is divided into counties (*xian*) and townships (*xiang*). In the Inner Mongolian Autonomous

Region, however, counties are still called banners (*qi*) and townships arrows (*sumu*).

³⁶ See Spense (1990: 28) and Crossley (1999: 134).

³⁷ Lee (1984: 215)



14.8. A Manchu Warrior



14.9. Manchu Warriors on Horseback

into the conflict between the Ruzhen and the Ming. Although a sense of gratitude and obligation ran deep in the minds of Koreans who were indebted to the Ming for their survival from the Japanese invasion, the ruler understood the reality of power balance. In the midst of his endeavor to enhance the Chosun's state of military preparedness (by repairing defensive strongpoints, renovating weaponry, and instituting training programs), however, Kwang-hae was removed from the throne and succeeded by King In-jo.³⁷ In-jo (1623-49) foolhardily switched to a pro-Ming and anti-Ruzhen policy. Lee (1984: 215) notes: "The Manchus now came to feel it necessary to eliminate the threat to their rear posed by Korea ... before proceeding with their campaign against Ming."

Hong Taiji had invaded Chosun in 1627 with a 30,000 man army, but withdrew his army in exchange for a Chosun's pledge to do honor to Later Kin as would a younger to an older brother. Hong Taiji officially renamed the Ruzhens the Manchus in 1635, declared himself emperor of the Qing in 1636, and demanded a suzerain-subject relationship. When the Chosun court refused to do so, Hong Taiji himself led an army of 100,000 men (consisting of the Manchu, Mongol and Chinese soldiers) and invaded Chosun. King In-jo surrendered in 1637, and vowed to sever his ties with the Ming court, to pay homage to the Qing court, and to dispatch troops to assist the Manchu campaign against Ming, delivering his two sons as hostages.

The Qing invasion was of short duration, but the northwest region through which the Manchus had passed was ravaged. When the Koreans maintained an adroit *Sa-dae* (Respect the Greater) strategy, yielding to the Stronger, be it the Qidans, the Ruzhens, the Mongols or the Han Chinese, the Korean dynasty could maintain its independent nationhood free from the ravages of warfare. When the Koreans prematurely relinquished their neutral stance or stood up against the obvious Stronger, they suffered wholesale destruction until they, voluntarily or involuntarily, changed their stance. A Manchurian force, in particular, could not leave standing the threat to their rear posed by the Koreans before proceeding with their campaign against mainland China. The Koreans had to be either neutralized or subdued.

THE EIGHT BANNERS OF THE MANCHU, MONGOLS AND HAN CHINESE: ENLISTING THE MONGOLS AS A JUNIOR PARTNER

A Xianbei or a Ruzhen force from Manchuria must necessarily subdue not only the Ye-maek Tungus in the east but also the Turko-Mongols in the west before commencing a successful campaign against the Han Chinese. By 1634, all of the Inner Mongolian tribes were incorporated into the Manchu state. The Manchus enlisted the Mongols as a junior partner in conquering the mainland China and maintaining the empire. Hong Taiji established a parallel structure of eight Mongol banners in 1635.³⁸ All the Mongols along the frontier, from Manchuria to Gan-su, were incorporated into the banner system. The descendants of Chinggis Khan received positions of rank in the Qing administration commanding their own tribal people. The Qing rulers effectively divided and immobilized the Mongols by organizing them under separate leagues with assigned pasturage.³⁹ The Qing dynasty depended heavily on Mongol troops to defend its Inner Asian frontier. The Ruzhens' sense of a shared identity with their Mongol allies was based on the broad similarities in their cultures.⁴⁰

Ledyard (1983: 328) notes: "their attitude and policy toward the Mongols was much more friendly ... the Manchus enlisted them as active supporters and friends." According to Purdue (2005: 124), "intermarriage with Mongolian noble families further cemented alliance between the two peoples. ... From 1612 to 1615 Nurhaci and his sons together married six Mongolian women. ... Hong Taiji expanded the marriage alliance policy, marrying twelve of his daughters to Mongolian chieftains."

Mobilizing the Han Chinese (called *Nikan*) around the Liao River basin, Hong Taiji established two full Chinese banners in 1637, increasing the number to four in 1639, and then to eight in 1642, just in time for the conquest of China that began two years later. As much as 40 percent of the conquest force in 1644 consisted of the Han Chinese bannermen.⁴¹ After Han Wu-di had conquered Old Chosun in 108 BCE, a large number of Han Chinese came to settle in the fertile Liao basin area. The descendants of these original settlers joined the Qing military organization and came to

³⁸ Spence (1990: 30-31)

³⁹ According to Barfield (1989: 6), the Mongol "banner princes were set apart from ordinary tribesmen who were not permitted to leave the boundaries of their districts."

According to Jagchid and Symons (1989: 21), the Qing rulers implemented a quasi-feudal system of rewarding Mongol leaders with rank and territorial domains based on their nobility, prestige, and how well they might serve Qing causes. Manchu policy fragmented the steppe by carefully delineating land holdings. As boundaries became demarcated, the mobility of the nomads, which had always been a key to their power, was impeded. The Mongol leaders became to seek greater influence and rewards from the Qing court.

⁴⁰ See Elliot (2001: 75).

According to Jagchid and Symons (1989: 21), "as the Manchus consolidated their rule over China, they were highly dependent upon Mongol auxiliaries to supplement their military forces." Purdue (2005: 126) notes that "the successful incorporation of the Eastern and Southern Mongols during the early conquest period provided a substantial fund of experience that the Manchus could use when they confronted the more isolated, hostile, and autonomous Mongolian tribes farther west."

⁴¹ According to Crossley (1999: 56, 118), the *Nikans*, the Han Chinese who had lived around the Liao River basin and consequently played an important role in the creation of the empire, were treated differently from those Han Chinese who lived inside the Great Wall. After 1741, the Qing state transferred most of the *Nikan* bannermen to the Manchu banners, and the Chinese banners were thereafter not distinguished from the Han Chinese civilian population.

⁴² According to Crossley (1997: 6-7), the Chinese bannermen should not be identified with the Chinese because some of the so-called Chinese bannermen “certainly originated in northern China,” but “others were probably of Korean origin,” and “a large number were evidently of Ruzhen ancestry, who were either the children of parents who had adopted many or all elements of Chinese or Korean culture, or were assimilated themselves.” She (ibid) notes that: “Their outstanding characteristics were fluency in Chinese, strong personal associations with the Chinese towns of Liao-dong ... and by the end of the Qing period [they] were seen as indistinguishable from Manchus.”

See also Elliot (2001: 77)

⁴³ The officer candidates were required to be proficient in horsemanship and archery and to contribute an examination essay in either Manchu or Mongolian. The Han Chinese

constitute the core of the Chinese Eight Banners, enabling the Ruzhen Qing rulers to conquer the entire mainland China.⁴² The creolized Chinese language of Liao-dong or rather the language of these Chinese bannermen, was taken to Beijing by the Ruzhen-Manchu rulers and eventually became the so-called Mandarin, the official language of modern China.

By the early 1640s, the Manchu ruler finished organizing a hereditary socio-military system for soldiers to provide active combat duty on rotation, to register and protect their families, and to supervise work on their land. Banner units were organized along traditional tribal lines but were all personally attached to the emperor. The banner elites were recruited from hereditary ranks of the Manchu, Mongol and Han Chinese, and were trained to perform both military and civil tasks to further the ends of conquest and occupation.⁴³ The bannermen enjoyed booty in warfare, and stipends of rice and cash in peacetime, and they also formed a talent pool from which individuals could be chosen as civil bureaucrats.⁴⁴ The pre-conquest ideal of the bannermen as comprehensive state functionaries (soldiers, clerks, or officials) continued to shape the Qing educational policies after the conquest.⁴⁵ Elliott (2001: 348) states that every Manchu man, woman, and child, with the sole exception of the emperor, belonged to the Eight Banners.⁴⁶ The Eight Banners system was a highly militarized form of social organization.

In 1643, Hong Taiji suddenly died, leaving his younger brother Dorgon as the regent for his five-year-old (ninth) son. In 1644, the rebel Li Zi-cheng seized the Ming capital, and then sent his forces to the Shanhai-guan pass to attack the Ming General, Wu Sangui (1612-78). The Qing army of Manchu, Mongol and Chinese banners together with Wu Sangui, who threw in his lot with the Manchus, marched down the coast and entered Beijing. The boy emperor, called Shun-zhi (1644-61), began reigning in Beijing in 1644. Shun-zhi's mother was a descendant of Genghis Khan, and the grandmother of the Kang-xi emperor.⁴⁷ It took eighteen more years to hunt down the Ming royal families and their supporters. In 1661, the last remnants of the Ming pretenders were executed in Yunnan province by Wu Sangui.

More than a decade before the Manchu's entrance into

mainland China, they had created in Shen-yang the Six Ministries, in exact imitation of those at the Ming court, staffed by a bureaucracy in which Manchus, Mongols, and Chinese were represented. The Qing court also introduced the examination system for appointment to the civil service. By the time the Manchus entered North China, they were fully prepared to rule in the Chinese way while maintaining their Manchu identity.

The Chinese bannermen made up three quarters of the total bannermen by 1648, while 8 percent were Mongols and only 16 percent Manchus (that rose to 23 percent by 1723).⁴⁸ Many of the Chinese bannermen spoke both Manchu and Chinese. Without the Han Chinese bannermen (including the Chinese bondservants), there would probably have been no conquest of the Ming Empire.⁴⁹

Less than 400,000 (Manchu, Mongol, and Han Chinese) bannermen had taken over the Ming China, establishing banner garrisons (the so-called Manchu cities) at Beijing and 18 strategic provincial cities where soldiers were allotted a place to live with their households behind a wall that separated them from local Han Chinese.⁵⁰ Fairbank and Goldman (1992: 1) notes: "After 2 million or so Manchus took power over 120 million or so Chinese, the Qing dynasty governed the Chinese people for 267 years while their numbers rose to about 400 million."

The Manchus were not bound by the Chinese tradition that required the eldest son, whether an idiot or a rogue, to take the throne: "Instead, in good Altaic fashion, they were free to choose the most capable heir (Elliott, 2001, p. 356)." Over a period of 133 years, three capable and hard-working Manchu emperors extolled the Confucian virtues and consolidated the new empire: the Kang-xi (1661-1722), Yong-zheng (1722-36), and Qian-long (1736-96). Emperor Kang-xi led a major steppe campaign in person, enjoying the excitement of the war.⁵¹ The legacy of these three rulers stems from their creation of a multi-ethnic empire with ideological synthesis that was the direct ancestor of the People's Republic of China.

The Yuan dynasty had conquered the oasis states of Islamic Central Asia and also the state of Dali, and made Tibet into a subordinate state. The Mongol armies had reached into

bannermen were gradually transformed into civil servants primarily. See Crossley (1999: 287-9).

⁴⁴ Fairbank (1992: 146-7)

⁴⁵ Crossley (1997: 127)

⁴⁶ By giving up the banner status, however, they could conduct commercial activities or manual labor.

⁴⁷ Wu Sangui (1612-78) was a native of Liao-dong, whose father and concubine were captured by Li Zicheng in 1644. See Crossley (1997: 76, 106-7)

⁴⁸ See Fairbank and Goldman (1992: 146). According to Elliott (2110: 364), the estimated number of male Manchus in the Eight Banners increased from about 160,000 to 450,000 persons and that of male Mongols from 84,000 to 180,000 persons, while the total number of male Han Chinese increased from about 133,000 to 600,000 persons between 1648 and 1720. Including females and bondservants, the total population of Eight Banners increased from about 1.9 million persons in 1648 to 3.7 million persons in 1720.

⁴⁹ Spence (1990: 41)

⁵⁰ See Elliott (2001: 348, 364).

⁵¹ See Fairbank and Goldman (1992: 147-8), Purdue (2005: 188), and Barfield (1987: 285).

⁵² The Eastern Mongols cooperated with the Manchu, and survived as a people to become an independent state in the twentieth century. The Western Mongols ferociously resisted the Qing and faced ethnic extermination. The Zunghars completely disappeared. Purdue (2005: 286)

⁵³ Crossley (1999: 128) and Elliott (2001: 351)



14.10. The Banner Garrisons (Manchu City) at Hang-zhou and Jing-zhou

Burma, and attempted to conquer Vietnam and Champa. The Manchu rulers were apparently inspired by the Mongol conquests, and came to provide modern China with a territorial unification of much greater extent than that achieved by the Han and Tang dynasties. By the mid-1770s, Emperor Qian-long completed the conquest of Inner Asia, specifically Zungharia (the area east of Tarbaghatai and west of Altai Mountains) and Xin-jiang (the area south of Tian-shan and north of Kun-lun Mountains) that were all inherited by what is now the People's Republic of China.⁵² The inclusion of Manchuria was a direct consequence of the Manchu rule.

The Manchu partnership with the Mongols lasted until the last days of the Qing dynasty. Most Han Chinese banner men of Liao-dong provenance, the *Nikans*, were co-opted as honorary Manchus, but the partnership with Wu Sangui and other Han Chinese collaborators who took over large satrapies in South and Southwest China could not last long. In 1673, the three Han Chinese feudatories rebelled, but crushed by the young Emperor Kang-xi. "Emperor" Wu Shifan, Sangui's grandson, committed suicide in 1681. The vigor and intelligence, or rather the ingenuity, of the Qing rulers enabled the conquest of all of mainland China, using remarkably few human resources and without resorting to the massacres and terrorizing destructiveness of the Mongols.

In 1740, the Qian-long emperor commanded that selected Mongols, Koreans, and the Nikans be enrolled in the Manchu banners. By 1779, the Han Chinese banner men had been eliminated from all Manchu garrison cities save Beijing and Guang-zhou.⁵³ After a protracted process of weeding-out the Han Chinese banner men, all banner people eventually came to be recognized as the Manchus (or Mongols). According to Fairbank and Goldman (1992: 148-9), "the only Chinese troops given a recognized existence were provincial forces that were used mainly as a constabulary on the post routes and against bandits but which lacked any training as a striking force."

EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN THE MANCHUS' RACIAL PURITY

The Six Ministries had joint Manchu and Chinese presidents, and the provinces had Manchu governors-general and Chinese governors. The capable Chinese, recruited through


the examination system, did the work while the loyal Manchus checked up on them.⁵⁴ According to Fairbank and Goldman (1992: 143 and 151), “as part of their system of control the Manchu rulers tried to preserve the Manchu language and followed the Qidan, Ruzhen, and Mongol examples in creating a Manchu documentation that was generally unavailable to Chinese officials.” Important documentation was written only in Manchu.

The Manchu tried to maintain their racial purity by banning intermarriage and fostering separate customs between the Han Chinese and Manchu. They kept to their own private religious practices, which were conducted by shamanic priests and priestesses in temple compounds to which the Chinese were denied access.⁵⁵ They tried to maintain their martial superiority by practicing hunting and mounted archery. They emphasized their cultural distinctness by using the Manchu spoken and written language. Having deemed the Han Chinese practice of binding the feet of their women extremely barbarous, the Qing rulers proscribed foot-binding for Manchu women. The Manchu emperors spent summers in Inner Mongolia (Rehe=Jehol=Chengde), maintaining physical fitness by riding, hunting, and shooting.⁵⁶

Emperor Qian-long prescribed rigorous study of the Manchu language and of military skills for banner education. He formalized the Old Manchu Way: immersion in military arts of riding and shooting, the speaking and writing of Manchu, shamanism, frugality, and reverence for the lineages. He stated that “whether you have studied classical literature [the Four Books] is a matter of no concern to me.”⁵⁷ The performance of songs at the Qian-long court celebrating the twelfth-century victories of the Ruzhen Kin dynasty over the Song was an indication of the sense the Manchus had of following in the footsteps of the Ruzhens.⁵⁸

THE IDEOLOGY OF MANCHU RULERS ON THEIR ETHNIC ORIGIN

In an imperial edict (dated September 20, 1777) commissioning the “Researches on Manchu Origins” (*Man-zhou Yuan-lin Gao*, completed six years later in 1783), emperor Qian-long presented his own disquisition on the history of



14.11. Beijing under the Manchus was divided into eight sectors, each sector serving as the residential zone for one of the Eight Banners. Each zone was further divided into Manchu, Mongol, and Chinese banner neighborhoods.

(Blue-colored areas surrounding the Imperial City were for the Manchu Banners.)

⁵⁴ Fairbank and Goldman (1992: 148-149)

⁵⁵ Spence (1990: 41)

⁵⁶ The Qing court did not mind the rapid spread of the Yellow Lamaist sect of Tibetan Buddhism among the Mongols. According to Jagchid and Symons (1989: 21), “during the later Qing period, as the Manchus became less reliant on Mongol military power, the registration of Mongols for military service and governmental policies towards the Tibetan Buddhist church grew lax. As the popularity of Buddhism spread, almost half of the male Mongols renounced secular concerns to become lamas and join monasteries. This massive exodus of Mongols from nomadic life diminished the potential for

a resurgent Mongol military threat to China because monks produced no offspring and they themselves were unprepared for battle.”

The Manchu somehow ordered all of the Chinese to adopt the Manchu hairstyle (of shaving foreheads and braiding hair in the back) and high-collar tight-jacket dress (instead of the loosely hanging robes of the Ming).

⁵⁷ Crossley (1999: 307-9)

⁵⁸ Elliott (2001: 355)

⁵⁹ 欽定 滿洲源流考

卷首諭旨 乾隆四十二年八月十九日上諭頃閱金史世紀云 金始祖居 完顏部 其地有白山黑水...本朝肇興...與大金正同 史又稱金之先出靺鞨部古肅慎地...三韓命名第列辰韓馬韓弁韓而不詳其意義 當時三國必有三汗各統其一 史家不知汗為君長之稱遂以音詞誤譯 而庸鄙者甚至訛韓為族姓...有三韓 訂謬之作惜未令人盡讀之而共喻耳若...

卷七 部族 完顏 五代 金史世紀

金之先 出靺鞨氏...古肅慎地也...金之始祖...初從高麗來 按通考及大金國志云 本自新羅來姓完顏氏 新羅王金姓 相傳數十世則金之自新羅來無疑建國之名 亦應取此金史地理誌乃云以國有金水源為名 史家附會之詞未足憑耳 居完顏部

卷七 部族 完顏 遼...祥符三年 契丹征高麗道由女真 女真復與高麗合兵拒之 契丹大敗而還 自天聖後屬契丹世襲節度使兄弟相傳 其帥本新

Manchuria.⁵⁹ The Qing rulers traced the Manchu origins not only to the Sushen-Mohe-Ruzhen Tungus, but also to the Three Han, Silla and Paekche of the Ye-maek Tungus, as well as to the Parhae, the Macro-Tungus. As a common denominator, the reputation of all those Tungusic people for their excellent archery marksmanship (on horseback) and fighting capabilities was very much amplified. The *Man-zhou Yuan-liu Gao*, however, conspicuously excludes the Qidan and the Koguryeo because the Xianbei, on the one hand, had obviously nothing to do with the Manchu origins while the presence of (the Ye-maek Tungus) Koguryeo, on the other hand, might inflict serious damage on their effort to nurture a hegemonic image of the Sushen-Mohe Tungus in Manchurian history.

Neither the Western nor the Han Chinese specialists in the history of China ever mention the following fact recorded in (the Wan-yan section of Book 7, *Buzhi*) *Man-zhou Yuan-liu Gao*: the *History of Kin* states that the founder of the Kin dynasty came from Koguryeo but the *Chronicle of Great Kin* notes that he had originally come from Silla with the clan name of Wan-yan. Since the Silla royal surname of Kim (implying Golden) has been transmitted from generation to generation over many dozens of generations, the *Chronicle* continues, the royal surname of Silla without doubt became its dynastic name.⁶⁰ Both the Western and the Han Chinese specialists in the history of China also fail to mention the fact that the emperor Qian-long addressed a quarter of his edict to the people of the Korean peninsula.⁶¹ The *Hei-shui* Mohe were described in the Tang history as an uncultured people of terrifying fierceness, possessing a deadly poison for arrow tips. The emperor Qian-long apparently believed that the Manchus were rooted not only in these warlike peoples, but they were also rooted in the peoples of the ancient kingdoms of the Korean peninsula (see Crossley, 1997, pp. 122-5).

No combination of efforts, however, could save the Manchus from the fate of being sinicized. Conquering China implied sinicization and ethnic self-destruction. After the late 19th century, the whole of Manchuria itself came to be engulfed by the massive influx of Han Chinese, who now constitute approximately 90 percent of the total Manchurian

population. The Manchu language had all but disappeared, surviving today in China's far west among a handful of descendants of one military (banner) garrison.⁶²

The end of Qian-long's life (1711-99) coincided with the end of tripolar East Asia—the old order. After Kang-xi, Yong-zheng and Qian-long, the emperors became insignificant and eventually irrelevant; ordinary people on the street did not so much as remember their names. The evolution in the China-Mongolia-Manchuria triangle left only Outer Mongolia and Korean peninsula to maintain independent polity on the Northeast Asian continent as of the 21st century.

THE SINO-CENTRIC BASICS IN WRITING THE QING HISTORY

A typical sino-centric history (or rather a fiction) of China reads as follows: the Qing empire was “given a certain political and cultural cast by the Manchus”; or the Qing empire was “controlled by the Manchus”; or the Qing empire was founded by the Manchus but the Qing rulers “remade the court to bring it into harmony with established Chinese values” and the “golden age was represented in the rule of the Qian-long emperor, the most Confucian and sinified” of the Qing rulers. According to Crossley (1999: 3), these are the “basics” that are “accepted” in the field of Qing history. According to the sinocentric ideology, any successful alien dynasty was a successfully sinified dynasty, and any alien dynasty that had failed to absorb and assimilate the Han Chinese tradition was bound to fail.

Under the Ming dynasty (1368-1644), traditional Chinese civilization flourished. The Ming emperors, however, had struggled with civil officials for control. The Qing emperors ruled. The centralized bureaucracy with specialized civil and military functions effectively had control, enforcing an elaborate set of law over extensive human and non-human resources down to the county level. The Manchu more than doubled the territory of the empire. The thirteen Ming provinces and the two metropolitan regions were restructured into eighteen provinces that constituted the inner territory, known as “China proper.” Manchuria, Mongolia, Sin-kiang, Tibet, and Taiwan were administered separately under the command of non-Han Chinese. The conquest elite promoted

羅人 號完顏氏 女真服其隸事以首
領推之自哈富...哈富生... 生...次太
祖次太宗 ...國號大金

卷七 部族 元...金始祖 本從 新羅
來 號完顏氏 所部稱完顏部 新羅王
金姓則金之遠派出

⁶⁰ The statement that the founder of the Kin dynasty came from Silla is repeated several times in the *Man-zhou Yuan-liu Gao*. It was the Geography Section of the *History of Kin* which says that the dynastic name Kin was based on the Ruzhen name of the river Ashi, a southern tributary of the Lower Song-hua.

金史 志第五 地理上 上京路 國言
金曰按出虎 以按出虎水源於此 故
名金源 建國之號蓋取諸此

⁶¹ Qian-long also noted the confusion in the Chinese records over the names of the Three Hans of Korea. The “han” in Ma-han, Chin-han, or Pyun-han was clearly a reference to a ruler – a khan. The Chinese historians simply had not known that “han” was a term for a leader. “The Manchus and their immediate predecessors in the Northeast, the emperor went on to emphasize, had been subjected to just such mistreatment in the Chinese records (see Crossley, 1999, p. 302).”

⁶² The total estimated population of Manchuria was 22.6 million persons in 1891, and 46.8 million in 1942. See Gottschang and Lary (2000: 172-3). It

has grown to more than 100 million people by 1990 plus an additional 10 million in the northern leagues of Inner Mongolia. As of 1990, the population registered as Manchu numbered about 10 million, and Koreans about 2 million.

See Janhunen (1996: 39, 43, 47).

⁶³ Peterson (2002: 1)

their martial traditions and ruled the empire. They resisted sinification. They prospered with their own system, and they perished with their own system.


The period from 1680 to 1780 under “alien rule” has been celebrated as a prosperous age in Chinese history.⁶³ The population increased from approximately 100 million c. 1500 to more than 300 million c. 1800. A proper interpretation of the history of East Asia until 1799 would enable a more accurate understanding of modern East Asia since 1800.

6. What Part of Manchuria Could Be Ruled, Even Intermittently, by the Han Chinese?

After the Han Wu-di’s conquest of Old Chosun in 108 BCE, the Han Chinese began to inhabit the fertile Liao River basin called Liao-dong. It was the only part of Manchuria that could be put under direct control of the Han Chinese dynasties, off and on, for about 800 years out of the last three millennia (1000 BCE-2000 CE). The Han Chinese settlements were localized almost entirely on a triangular area in southwestern Manchuria centering on the alluvial basin of the Liao River and the uplands of the Liao-dong Peninsula. This area came to be surrounded by a guarded line marked by trees and ditches punctuated with fortified gatehouses.

The Manchu Qing rulers mobilized the Liao-dong Han Chinese, in the form of Chinese Bannermen, for their conquest of the Ming dynasty. When they finished conquering the entire mainland of China, the Qing rulers reclassified many of the original Chinese Bannermen as honorary Manchus, and made the Altaicized Chinese of Liao-dong as the official language, called Mandarin, for the entire Han Chinese, though they themselves continued to speak the Manchu language (see Crossley, 1999, p. 56 and Janhunen, 1996, pp. 163-7).

As a major way of preserving their identity and their control of mainland China, the Manchu Qing rulers tried to maintain their homeland as a base separate from the Han Chinese life and culture. In order to prevent Chinese immigration from the Liao River basin northward, northern and eastern Manchuria were closed to Chinese immigration in



14.12. The Qian-long Emperor
Hunting Hare (1755)


1668. A long ditch with an embankment, repeatedly repaired and expanded, was built across southwestern Manchuria during the early days of the Qing dynasty (1616-1912). It ran from the Great Wall at Shanhai-guan, crossed the Liao River to the north of Mukden (Shen-yang), and then returned to the coast near the Korean border down at the Yalu. It marked the boundary of the pale beyond which the Han Chinese should not expand, the statutory limit of Chinese settlement.⁶⁴

The big ditch several hundred miles long and lined with willows is known as the Willow Palisade (*Liu-tiao Bian*). The Qing pale surrounded by the Willow Palisade is a little bit larger than the Ming pale surrounded by the defensive wall (*Bian Qiang*), constructed by the Ming during 1437-42 and 1479-81 that was to defend the Liao-dong area from the intrusion of the Mongol-Xianbei and the Ruzhen.⁶⁵ It had delineated the Ming borderline in Manchuria.


The Inner Willow Palisade extending from Shanhai-guan to the mouth of the Yalu River was intended to keep Han Chinese out of north and east Manchuria, and the Outer Willow Palisade connecting the Liao River (at the north of Shen-yang) and the Song-hua River (at the north of Jilin) was to keep the Mongolic Xianbei out of Manchuria. Manchu and Mongol bannermen were stationed at twenty outposts (*karun*) to patrol its perimeter. The Manchus tried to close their homeland to Chinese immigration and maintain Manchuria as a hunting land outside the Chinese agricultural economy. Most of Manchuria, with its hunting lands, forests, and streams, was thus preserved for the tribal Manchu peoples for a long while.

If we look back over the past three millennia (1000 BCE-2000 CE), we see that the Han Chinese were able to occupy the Liao-dong area for less than 840 years: at most 328 years during the Han dynasties (206 BCE.-220 CE) after Wu-di's conquest of Old Chosun in 108 BCE; 45 years during the Cao Cao's Wei dynasty (220-65); less than 51 years during the Western Jin dynasty (265-316); 89 years during the Tang dynasty (618-907) after 668 until the An Lu-shan Rebellion (755-57); 276 years during the Ming dynasty (1368-1644); and 51 years under the People's Republic of China (1949-2000).

During the 364 year period after the beginning of the era of Five Barbarians and Sixteen States (304-439) until the



14.13. Qian-long Emperor Returning to the Palace from the Southern Inspection Tour (1764-70)



⁶⁴ See Elliott (2001: 50), Fairbank,

Reischauer and Craig (1973: 223) and Fairbank (1992: 148).

⁶⁵ See Kim (2004: 598-601).

fall of Koguryeo in 668, Liao-dong had been occupied briefly by the Xianbei (Former Yan, 349-70) and then for a long time by Koguryeo. Liao-dong had subsequently been occupied by such “barbarian dynasties” as Parhae (after the An Lu-shan rebellion in 757 until 926) for 169 years; Qidan Laio (916-1125) for 209 years; Ruzhen Kin (1115-1234) for 119 years; Mongol Yuan (1206-1368) for 162 years; and Manchu Qing (1616-1911) for 295 years until at last it was taken over by the modern (People’s Republic of) China.



14.14. Emperor Qian-long



Qingdai Liu-tiao-bian 清代柳条边 楊樹森, 遼寧省: 人民出版社, 1978

