


Chapter Nine

Ordo-Tribal Army
and the Dual Government System

The Qidan-Xianbei Establish
A Proto-Pan-Manchurian Conquest Dynasty



“世傳東丹王是也” 耶律阿保機 太子耶律倍 東丹國(舊渤海 926-82)王 King of Dongdan (Eastern Qidan) and his company: Aboji conquered Parhae, and appointed as its king his eldest son, Bei. Boston Museum of Fine Arts

Liao Brick and Wooden Pagodas (top) Ningcheng 寧城 崇興寺雙木塔 (bottom) Chaoyang 朝陽 北(磚)塔

¹ 資治通鑑 卷二百五十二 唐紀六十八 僖宗 乾符二年 [875] 黃巢...以販私鹽爲事...屢舉進士不第 遂爲盜 卷二百五十四 唐紀七十 僖宗 廣明二年 [880] 十二月...入長安...尤憎官吏 得者皆殺之...黃巢殺唐宗室在長安者 無遺類

² Wang (1963: 27-8) notes: "Zhu Wen (朱溫/全忠) had been Huang Chao's (黃巢) general and was prefect of Tongzhou (同州) when he surrendered to the Tang imperial commander in ... 882. He was the third son of an impoverished teacher. When his father died, he was brought up to be...a manor steward in the household where his mother worked as a servant. He... formed his own bandit gang [and] some time in 876-7, he...joined Huang Chao."

資治通鑑 卷二百六十三 唐紀七十九 昭宗 天復三年 [903] 正月...全忠以兵驅宦官...二月...時宦官盡死 卷二百六十五 唐紀八十一 昭宗 天祐二年 [905] 五月 李振...曰 朝廷所以不理 良由衣冠浮薄之徒 紊亂綱紀 且王欲圖大事 ...不若盡去之 全忠以爲然...或門胄高華 或科第自進 居三省臺閣...貶逐無虛日 搢紳 [文官] 爲之一空 六月... 李振屢舉進士 竟不中第 故深疾 搢紳之士 言於全忠曰 此輩常自謂清流 宜投之黃河 使爲濁流 全忠笑而從之...

³ As a boy, Li Keyong (李克用 856-908) had followed his father (朱邪赤心 d.883) to put down the Pang Xun (龐勳) mutiny in 868-9, and later helped the Tang court to subdue the Huang

CHAPTER NINE ORDO-TRIBAL ARMY AND DUAL GOVERNMENT SYSTEM QIDANS ESTABLISH A PAN-MANCHURIAN CONQUEST DYNASTY

While the Xianbei cousins who had settled themselves in mainland China came to lose every vestige of their military valor, the Qidan tribes which originated from the Yuwen-Xianbei could apparently uphold their nomadic warrior tradition on the western Manchurian steppe. When the Tang dynasty of Tuoba-Xianbei provenance was deposed, the Qidans felt fully justified in their claim to the throne.

The Dual System of governance was blatantly dualized by the Liao rulers in the form of a mutually independent dual government under the emperor's inner council. The northern area of less than one million Qidan-Xianbei people was governed according to tribal law by officials dressed in the traditional Qidan costume. The southern area of three million Chinese was governed by a Chinese-style bureaucracy staffed at first almost entirely by the Han Chinese who were the talented literati or ex-officials, captured by or voluntarily allied themselves with the Liao, and then by the Han Chinese who were recruited from the gentry families through the recommendations and examinations, all dressed in the Chinese style.

The Qidan and other conquered tribes were mobilized to serve in the supra-tribal military units, called *ordo*, or in the regional tribal armies. An *ordo* army of a hundred thousand horsemen was always ready to strike before the tribal armed forces and militia could be mobilized. Few Qidan officials and cavalry soldiers were stationed in the southern Han Chinese territories, and the grasslands of tribal regions remained the domain of the Qidan and other tribal followers. To the devout Liao rulers, Buddhism was an "imperial religion" that was compatible with their cherished tribal beliefs. The Qidans, however, could not successfully co-opt the Tungusic people for their empire building, showing a much less successful conquest performance than the Tuoba-Xianbei, who chose peaceful coexistence with Koguryeo.

The Han Chinese and many western scholars assert that the Qidan-Xianbei conquerors soon became sinicized, and their rule that of a typically Chinese dynasty. The Qidans, in fact, continued to maintain the center of political and military power in their old tribal territory. They never abandoned their typically tribal political and military organization nor their former secular traditions or religious beliefs, and the mass of the Qidan people continued to pursue pastoral activities.

1. Birth of a Proto Pan-Xianbei-Tungus Conquest Dynasty

With the collapse of the Tang Empire, there appeared a host of successor dynasties to the Tang in North China, every one of them claiming imperial status, that included a dynasty of lowly Chinese peasant origin, three dynasties of the Shatuo Turks, and a dynasty founded by a Han Chinese usurper general. The five short-lived dynasties north of the Huai River are, Standen (2007: 9) notes, “cast as ‘Chinese’ resisting the inevitable predations of the ‘barbarian’ Qidan.”

When the Tang dynasty of Tuoba-Xianbei provenance was deposed, the Qidan which originated from the Yuwen-Xianbei were, according to Eberhard (2005: 199), “among the claimants to the Chinese throne...feeling fully justified in their claim.” The *Jinshi* (金史志選舉一) states that “Liao arose as a successor to Tang (遼起唐季),” and Mote (1999: 8) states that Liao took the Tang’s “universal imperial system as its political model.” Owing to the strength of Shatuo Turks in the west and the Tungusic enemies behind (i.e., the Parhae in Manchuria and the Koryeo in Korean Peninsula), however, the expansion of the Liao empire was bound to be slow.

“TANG RESTORATION” BY THE SHATUO TURKIC DYNASTIES

Huang Chao (?-884) had failed the *jinsbi* examination, and then joined the peasant rebellion to become its leader (875-84). “Wherever his troops went,” Wang (1963: 85) states, “he did not spare the scions of the ruling families, and at Chang’an [in 880] he encouraged a veritable blood-bath.” The hated ruling families were the families of the hereditary Xianbei aristocrats and the high-ranking Han Chinese collaborators.¹

Zhu Wen (Quanzhong 852-912), the founder of Later Liang (907-23), was a lower class eastern Chinese who had supported Huang Chao, but went over to the Tang and became a military governor in 882. Zhu took the Tang court under his control by 903-6, liquidating eunuchs, purging scholar officials, killing most of the imperial families, relocating the capital to Luoyang on April 9, 904, and replacing Zhaozong (r.888-904) with a 13-year old emperor on August 15, 904. Eberhard (2005: 182-3) states: Zhu “himself was of peasant origin, and so were a large part of his subordinates. All of them were opposed to the

Chao rebels in 875-84. Li governed Hedong from his base at Taiyuan. Wang (1963: 5, 29) notes: “The Tang restoration in 923-6 [by Keyong’s son Cunxu] revived features of Tang government which had already been proved ineffectual.” Eberhard (1965: 154-5) notes that the Shatuo rulers also played polo (a non-Chinese game), of which the emperors of Tang were very fond. The founder of Tang dynasty was born to the Tuoba-Xianbei ruling clan, but then the Shatuo, in their own way, tried their best to become “imitators of Tuoba-Xianbei (ibid: 147).” The Shatuo Turks had lived in the Ordos steppe where the Tuoba-Xianbei formerly maintained pastures for their horses, and the emperors of the Shatuo dynasty, “liked to visit the famous Buddhist caves at Longmen ... built by the Tuoba about 500 (ibid: 146-7).”

資治通鑑 卷二百七十一 後梁紀六 貞明五年[919] 十月 晉王[後唐莊宗] ... 石敬瑭[後晉高祖] 與梁人戰... 劉知遠[後漢高祖]... 爲殿... 敬瑭以是親愛之... 其先皆沙陀人 敬瑭 李嗣源[後唐明宗]之壻也... 同光元年[923] 李繼韜... 募士... 郭威[後周太祖]往應募

⁴ 遼史 卷一 本紀第一 太祖... 姓耶律氏... 字阿保機... 天顯十一年[936]... 冊敬瑭爲大晉皇帝... 十二年... 晉... 請上尊號及歸雁門以北與幽薊之地 仍歲貢帛三十萬疋 資治通鑑 卷二百八十一 後晉紀二 高祖 天福三年 [938] 七月 帝事契丹甚謹 奉表稱臣 謂契丹主爲父皇 帝 每契丹使至 帝于別殿 拜受詔敕 歲輸金帛三十萬之外

The Sixteen Prefectures are also called the Yan-Yun region (雁門以北 與幽薊之地) or, in the words of Mote (1999: 65) and Davis (2004: lx), the "defense line" for "the entire North China." Mote (1999: 65) notes: "In fact, the ceded territory included nineteen, not sixteen prefectures, but the phrase the 'Sixteen Prefectures' became fixed" Jin initially set its capital at Luoyang and then at Kaifeng.

⁵ 舊五代史 卷七十六 晉書二 高祖紀第二 天福二年 [937] 春正月...詔曰 應天開國... 宜於唐朝宗屬中取一人封公世襲 兼隋之鄴公爲二王後 以後周介公備三恪 主其祭祀
新五代史 卷八 晉本紀第八 天福四年 [939] 九月 封李從益爲鄆國公以封唐後...十一月 立唐高祖太宗[918-49]莊宗明宗愍帝[923-34]廟于西京

In 937, Jin Gaozu (石敬瑭) said that, because he founded the state by the Mandate from Heaven, he ought to select a descendant of the Tang imperial house to be invested as a hereditary duke (Duke of Xun), while designating the Duke Xi (鄆國公) of Sui as the heir to the two royal princes (二王後). Together with the Duke Jie (介國公) of Northern Zhou, they would constitute the *San-ke* (三恪 the designated heirs to the "three ancestor dynasties"). Apparently for the sake of the "threesome," the Duke of Han (韓國公), representing Northern Wei, had to be replaced by the Duke of Xun (鄆國公), representing the ritual heir to the Tang royal line.

gentry."²² Once having grabbed absolute power, Zhu and his lowly followers vengefully enjoyed the great slaughter of the Xianbei aristocrats, eunuchs, and Han Chinese gentry elite.

Having been a military governor for twenty-four years, Zhu Wen ruled, in his capital at Kaifeng (Bianjing), with his trusted relatives and retainers -- the provincial army officers. According to Wang (1963: 104), "under this first plebeian ruling group since the Former Han dynasty," members of the Chinese provincial families who had risen to power by military activities dominated the court. Most of the palace commissioners and attendants had "gained office and wealth from lowly origins in the last quarter of a century (ibid: 108)."

In 923, the small Shatuo tribe led by Li Keyong's first son, Cunxu (李存勳/莊宗 b.885/923-6), managed to overthrow the Han Chinese Liang dynasty, using the slogan of the Tang Restoration, and adopted the dynastic designation of Tang with its capital at Luoyang.³ The Han Chinese gentry preferred the Turks led by a chieftain with the imperial surname of Li to the savage Liang rulers of peasant origin, and hence actively helped the Shatuo Turks to rule millions of Chinese. Eberhard (2005: 183-4) states: "All the Chinese historians are enthusiastic about the Later Tang (923-36)," even naming it the "Restoration of Tang," while downgrading the pure-blooded Chinese Liang dynasty, because of its lowly peasant origin and its stance "against the gentry."

As Wang (1963: 109) writes, "Li Cunxu had built his power, as Zhu Wen had done, on the provincial form of government" in which the military governor had his own trusted retainers, preventing the eunuchs from controlling the armies. The provincial staff, mostly consisting of men of lowly origins, could often rise to the highest court offices without the "benefit of either blue blood or a literati education (ibid: 112)." The Restoration of Tang, in the sense of rule by the hereditary aristocracy and Han Chinese gentry-officials, could not be achieved by the Shatuo Turks, but by the Qidan-Xianbei.

Mingzong (李嗣源/明宗 Siyuan r.926-33) of Later Tang was Li Keyong's adopted son. Mindi (閔帝 r.933-4), Mingzong's younger son, killed himself in 934 but Mingzong's son-in-law Shi Jingtang was able to establish the Later Jin dynasty (後晉 936-46) by allying himself with the Qidan. Liao Taizong (Deguang r.926-47) defeated the Li Chongke's (末帝 r.934-6) Later Tang forces

near Taiyuan in 936, and made Shi Jingtang the emperor of Jin. Shi Jingtang (Jin Gaozu, r.936-42) offered Taizong a subordinate position in a father-son relationship as well as annual payments of gold and silk. He also offered to Liao the Sixteen Prefectures, “giving the Liao Empire unimpeded access to North China,” in the words of Mote (1999: 13).⁴

Shi Jingtang claimed that his dynasty was heir to the preceding three dynasties: Northern Zhou, Sui, and Tang. Ancestral temples were erected in the western capital for the five emperors of Tang that included the Li Keyong’s Tang: Gaozu-Taizong (r.918-49) and Zhuangzong-Mingzong-Mindi (r.923-34).⁵

Shi Jingtang had maintained a strict protocol of subject-sovereign relationship (奉表稱臣) with respect to Liao Taizong, who was addressed as Father Emperor (父皇帝). Shi Jingtang’s young successor (出帝 r.942-7) repudiated his subject status to the Qidan, inviting an invasion by the Liao army in 944.

The Shatuo Tang rulers had established the institution of the Imperial Bodyguard (*Shiwei Qinjun* 侍衛親軍) in order to check the power of regional governors.⁶ The Shatuo Jin rulers greatly strengthened the Imperial Bodyguard, but when the commander of “almost the entire Emperor’s Army,” who was an uncle of the emperor (Du Chongwei), “surrendered to the Qidans in December 946, the whole empire was at their mercy,” Wang (1963: 191) writes. Deguang entered the Jin capital Kaifeng on January 1, 947.⁷ The Imperial Bodyguard was disarmed and its horses confiscated. Deguang took several thousands of Jin officials with him as he headed home on March 17, 947, taking along with him the palace women, eunuchs, and musicians, and leaving behind his brother-in-law Xiao Han as the military governor of Bianzhou (Kaifeng).⁸

Liu Zhiyuan (895-948), Jingtang’s trusted commander of the Imperial Bodyguard, was the *Jiedushi* of Hedong (河東節度使) with its seat at Taiyuan, which had been the strategic refuge of the Shatuo imperial house, when he declared himself emperor of Later Han (後漢 947-51) on February 15, 947. By pure luck, Deguang died on April 21 and his successor had to be chosen, generating a military vacuum and allowing Liu to enter Kaifeng on July 11, 947.⁹

The court of Shatuo Han was, in the words of Wang (1963: 5), “an enlarged *Jiedushi* establishment.” The Imperial

⁶ The earliest reference to the Imperial bodyguard appears under the year 927.

資治通鑑 卷二百七十六 後唐紀五 明宗 天成二年 [927] 十月 以...石敬瑭爲宣武節度使兼侍衛親軍馬步都指揮使

⁷ Standen (2007: 83) states: “Another Jin general who had surrendered took the Jin capital Bianzhou for Liao. Deguang kept on Feng Dao (馮道) as chief minister and received the surrender of almost all the capital and provincial officials. Most of them reacted to the Liao conquest as just another change of dynasty, in which Deguang was understood to have full possession of the Mandate ... It was some weeks before the Hedong governor, Liu Zhiyuan, reneged on his initial acceptance of Deguang and declared himself emperor.”

⁸ See Standen (2007: 77-9, 81-3, 128). 新五代史 卷五十二 雜傳第四十 杜重威... 其妻石氏 晉高祖之女弟 高祖即帝位...拜...刺史 以典禁兵...遷侍衛親軍都指揮使...開運元年 [944] 加...北面行營招討使... 詣契丹請降... 召諸將告以降虜... 以上將先鋒 乃皆聽命... 於...曰 臣以晉軍十萬先降

資治通鑑 卷二百八十六 後漢紀一 高祖 天福十二年[947]正月 百官..迎契丹主...獨出班胡語 三月...餘留大梁 復以邕州爲..以蕭翰爲節度使 翰述律太后之兄子 其妹復爲契丹主后

⁹ See Wang (1963: 149, 187, 191-4).

¹⁰ Guo Wei's father (Jian) had served Li Keyong (晉王) as prefect of Shunzhou. Guo Wei (郭威 904-54) was orphaned young, and was imprisoned in February 923 for a murder but was set free by the son (李繼韜 d.923.12.) of the adopted son (嗣昭) of Li Keyong's younger brother (李克柔). Guo Wei briefly served in the Liang army. He served Shi Jingtang in 926-7 to become a senior aide in the Imperial Bodyguard. Sometime before 937, he began to serve Liu Zhiyuan (劉知遠) who was then the inspector-in-chief of the Imperial Bodyguard. Guo Wei came to command almost the entire Later Han army by 948.

新五代史 卷十一 周本紀第十一 太祖...父簡 事晉為順州刺史...子威少孤...殺之...繼韜惜其勇...置麾下 繼韜叛晉附于梁 後莊宗滅梁...後為侍衛軍吏 漢高祖為侍衛親軍都虞候...嘗以威從...隱帝即位...使西督諸將 資治通鑑 卷二百八十八 後漢紀三高祖 乾祐元年 [948] 八月 以郭威為...諸軍皆受 威節度... 後漢紀四 隱帝 乾祐三年 十一月...帝自即位以來...樞密使兼侍中郭威 主征伐

¹¹ 資治通鑑 卷二百九十二 後周紀三 太祖 顯德元年[954] 十月...今以農夫百 未能養甲士一...命大簡諸軍精銳者升之上軍...又以驍勇之士 多為藩鎮所蓄 詔募天下壯士...命太祖皇帝[趙匡胤] 選其尤者為殿前諸班 宋史 卷一 本紀第一 太祖一 諱匡胤 姓趙氏 涿郡人也...弘殷 是為宣祖...周...敬左驍騎衛上將軍...援唐莊宗[r.923-6]...留典禁軍...漢乾祐中 [951-6]...指揮使 周...顯德三年[956]

Bodyguard was rebuilt (ibid: 195), and soon superseded the governors as the dominant force, also countering the Qidan raids (ibid: 206). The teenage emperor Yindi (r.948-51), however, allowed a Han Chinese general, Guo Wei, to command the entire Army. Guo Wei established the Later Zhou dynasty (後周 951-60), presaging the appearance of the Song.¹⁰ The founder of the Han Chinese Song dynasty (960-1127-1279), Zhao Kuangyin (趙匡胤 r.960-76), was the commander of the Palace Corps (*Dian-Qian-Jun* 殿前軍) that had been created by Guo Wei in 954 to counter the power of the Imperial Bodyguard (ibid: 206).¹¹ The Shizong (Chai Rong 郭柴榮 r.954-9) of Later Zhou initiated (on January 8, 956) and the Taizong (Kuangyi 匡義 r.976-97) of Song completed the conquest of the Ten Kingdoms by May 979.

Guo Wei (Zhou Taizu r.951-4) had claimed that he was a descendant of the younger brother (號叔) of King Wen (周文王 1099/56-50 BCE) of ancient Zhou, and adopted the dynastic designation of Zhou, paying homage in person to the shrine of Confucius on June 1, 952. Shizong, the adopted son of Guo Wei, reaffirmed that he was led by the divine wisdom of the August Emperors (Yao-Shun), the Xia-Yin Founders (Yu-Tang), and the Zhou Kings (Wen-Wu-Cheng-Kang). He rebuked the Southern Tang rulers claiming to be the scion of the Tang royal family (自謂唐室苗裔) and serving the Qidan, discarding the Han Chinese (捨華事夷).¹² Davis (2004: Ixi) states: “Zhou dynasty... represents the return of Chinese rule...a factor clearly behind Ouyang Xiu’s enthusiasm for the regime” who had emphasized the fact that Shizong “invited to court the masters of Confucian crafts and ... eliminated 3,336 Buddhist temples (ibid: 115).”

The Han Chinese founders of both the Zhou and Song dynasties had served, from father to son, the Shatuo emperors as generals. Overtly ignoring the three Shatuo dynasties, Chinese historians cast the Five Dynasties as “Chinese,” eventually to be consolidated by the pure-blooded Han Chinese Song dynasty, the successor to the allegedly “Han Chinese” Sui-Tang dynasties.

THE QIDAN, ANOTHER CLAIMANT TO THE SUI-TANG SUCCESSION

The Qidan originated from the Yuwen-Xianbei that had been crushed by the Murong-Xianbei in 344 and split into the Shiwei, Xi (庫莫奚), and Qidan branches. The Qidan lived around the Xilamulun River, with the Xi in the south and west, and the

Shiwei in the north. The Qidan-Xianbei later became the tributaries of the Tuoba-Xianbei Wei. In 479, a large section of the Qidan tribes, threatened by the expansion of the Rouran Empire (402-552) in Mongolia, moved southeastward into the middle valley of the Liao River. The Qidan tribes became dependent on Koguryeo in 553. During the Tang campaign against Koguryeo in 645, however, the Qidans fought on the side of the Tang. In return, the Tang court bestowed on the chieftain of the Qidan confederation the imperial surname of Li in 648, and tried to control the Qidan tribes indirectly.¹³

The Qidan-Xianbei tribes came to occupy the Liaoxi area near modern Jehol and, in 696-7, launched a massive invasion of Hebei. Empress Wu sought help from the khaghan of the Eastern Turks, who were able to so thoroughly destroy the Qidan as to eliminate their threat to the Tang for more than two centuries. The Eastern Turkic Empire (682-741) was replaced by the Uighur Turkic Empire (744-840). The Qidan became vassals of the Uighur Turks, who taught the Qidan to grow melons and encouraged the use of camels. The Uighur Turks were destroyed by the wild Kirghiz Turks in 840.¹⁴ After 842, no information about the Qidan appears in the dynastic chronicles until the 890s, the final days of the Tang empire. While the Xianbei cousins who had settled themselves in mainland China came to lose every vestige of their military valor by this time, the Qidan-Xianbei tribes could apparently uphold their nomadic warrior tradition on the western Manchurian steppe. According to Grausset, the Kirghiz Turks were driven out of the Orkhon area in the early 920s by Abaoji (Liao Taizu 阿保機 b.872 r.907-26), and went back to the Yenisei steppes, creating a power vacuum on the Mongolian steppe for almost three hundred years until unification by Chinggis Khan in 1206.¹⁵

According to Wittfogel and Fêng (1949: 22), “the Qidan were one of three peoples descended from the Xianbei, the Xi and the Shiwei being the other two. ... If the Xianbei handed down their name to the Shiwei, and if the Shiwei, northern cousins of the Qidan, were ancestors of the Mongols, then the Qidan belonged to a proto-Mongol tribal complex. ... Added weight is given to this assumption by Shiratori’s belief that the Qidan language was predominantly Mongol.” According to Janhunen (1996: 191, 193), if we assume that “the Qidan and

...分典禁兵...卒...太祖 宣祖仲子也
...後唐天成二年[927] 生於洛陽...漢
[947-50]初..會周祖...應募居帳下...廣
順[951-4]初..副指揮...世宗即位[954]
復典禁兵...拜殿前都虞候 三年[956]
拜殿前都指揮使...六年[959]殿前都點
檢...恭帝即位...檢校太尉

¹² 資治通鑑 卷二百九十 後周紀一
太祖 廣順元年 [951] 春正月 漢太
后下詔 授監國符寶 即皇帝位... 曰
朕周室之裔 號叔之後 國號宜曰周...
二年[951]六月 帝如曲阜 謁孔子祠
卷二百九十二 後周紀三 世宗 顯德
三年[956] 二月 宣祖皇帝[趙弘殷]為
馬軍副都指揮使...至涿州...傳呼開
門 太祖皇帝[宿衛將趙匡胤]曰 父子
雖至親 城門王事也 ... 帝[世宗郭柴
榮]...命...襲...[南]唐主...自謂唐室苗
裔 南唐祖唐太宗之子吳王恪 ... 惟泛
海通契丹 捨華事夷 禮義安在
新五代史 卷十二 周本紀 第十二
世宗 ...太祖遂以為子...二年...大毀
佛寺... 嗚呼...方內延儒學文章之士
考制度...定...皆可施於後世... 即位
之明年 廢天下佛寺三千三百三十六
舊五代史 卷一百一十五 周書六 世
宗紀第二 顯德二年 [955] 詔曰...雖
堯舜禹湯之上聖 文武成康之至明...

¹³ Twitchett and Tietze (1994: 44, 45-8)
資治通鑑 卷九十七 晉紀一九 建元
二年[344] 鮑自將伐逸頭歸...宇文氏
由是散亡..徙其部眾五千餘落於昌黎
魏書 卷一百 列傳第八十八 失韋
國...語與庫莫奚 契丹 豆莫婁國同...
庫莫奚國之先 東部宇文之別種也...
契丹國 在庫莫奚東 異種同類
北史 卷九十四 列傳 第八十二 奚
本曰庫莫奚 其先東部胡宇文之別種

也 初為慕容晃所破 [344]...契丹國...
與庫莫奚異種同類並為慕容晃所破
...太和三年 [479] 高句麗竊與蠕蠕
謀欲取地豆干以分之 契丹舊怨其
侵軼...天保四年 [553]...寄於高麗...
隋開皇四年 [584]...契丹...背高麗
隋書 卷八十四 列傳第四十九 契丹
室韋 契丹之先 與庫莫奚異種而同
類 並為慕容氏所破... 室韋 契丹之
類也 其南者為契丹 在北者號室韋
分為五部...其國無鐵 取給於高麗
舊唐書 卷一百九十九下 列傳一百
四十九下 北狄 契丹 居...鮮卑之故
地...分為八部...諸部皆須議合 不得
獨舉 本臣突厥...不利則遁保...鮮卑
山...太宗伐高麗...授其蕃將...為左武
衛將軍 貞觀二十二年...賜姓李氏...
則天怒其反亂...攻陷冀州...俄而奚及
突厥之衆掩擊其後...以...東走

¹⁴ Wittfogel and Fêng (1949: 23)
新唐書 卷二百一十九 列傳 第一百
四十四 北狄 契丹 本東胡之種...攻
崇州...武后怒...突厥默啜襲破其部

¹⁵ Grausset (1970: 125) See also
Twitchett and Tietze (1994: 48-51, 65),
and Barfield (1989: 121,161,164-9).
遼史卷二 本紀第二 太祖下 天贊
三年 [924] 六月 大舉征 吐渾 党項
阻卜等部 八月 至...古單于國... 九
月...次古回鶻城...攻阻卜...金河水
取烏山石...十一月 獲甘州回鶻都督

The Kirghiz Turks never attempted to
incorporate the Uighur elite to found an
empire, learning the art of maintaining
the tributary connection. The Uighur
elite fled south (to the northwest region
of the Gansu corridor and farther west
in the northern Tarim Basin) and

several other...tribal groups of Southern Manchuria spoke
language of the Para-Mongolic branch, this branch must have
gradually taken shape among the southern tribes of the Xianbei,
to whom both the Murong and the Tuoba belonged. It is possible
that the Tuoba language was an early form of Qidanic, perhaps
even a language directly ancestral to Qidan. The Murong, Tuoba
and Qidan may then be regarded as three successive waves of
Para-Mongolic expansion. ... It is equally possible that the Pre-
Para-Mongolic homeland was located in the very territories of the
Tuoba and Qidan, from where the branch represented by the
Shiwei and the historical Mongols was taken northwards by an
ethnic movement.”

The Qidan-Xianbei tribes were primarily pastoral,
practicing hunting, fishing, and crude auxiliary agriculture. The
original core of the Qidan native territory was located on the
Liaoxi steppe, especially in the basin of the Xilamulun. This is the
region where the Qidan established their Supreme and Central
Capitals, and the hydronym Liao became the basis of their
dynastic name.¹⁶ The Qidan spoke a proto-Mongolian language
but, having been located between the deserts and steppes in the
west and the plains and forests in the east, the Qidan-Xianbei
culture had traits in common with both the Turks and the
Tungusic peoples.¹⁷ The relationship between the Xianbei and the
Yemaek Tungus had also been close enough for the *History of Liao*
to assert that the Liao state had originated from the old Chosun
land and maintained the customs and tradition of “the Ki-ja’s
Eight Clauses of Instruction” as the Chosun.¹⁸

Abaoji, like his father, was elected chieftain (*i-li-chin*) of
the *I-la* (later the Yelü 耶律) tribe in 901. The *I-la* tribe had ranked
next to the Yao-lian tribe of the khaghans, and his uncle had
served as prime minister and chief commander of the Qidan
forces. Abaoji himself had served as the commander of the
khaghans’s personal guard. Abaoji laid the foundation for the Liao
dynasty (907-1125) by gaining hegemony over the Liaoxi steppe
(the modern Jehol and Xilamulun areas) before he was elected
commander in chief at the age of thirty-one in 903; uniting the
Qidan-Xianbei tribes through war and marriage alliances; making
a series of spectacular raids on Youzhou and Hedong in 902-5 to
capture 95,000 Han Chinese and resettle them in his own
territories as farmer groups; rushing off to Datong with a 70,000-

man cavalry in 905 to help Li Keyong resist Zhu Wen and swearing brotherhood with Keyong, who had been governing Hedong from his base at Taiyuan; being elected as Khaghan in 907; sending cavalry forces to help Keyong's son, Cunxu, succeed his father in 908; and establishing control over a number of Parhae cities in the Liao River basin. Among those Han Chinese captured were, Standen (2007: 69) notes, a large number of literati and ex-officials, "who developed ministerial careers in the nascent Liao bureaucracy."¹⁹

According to the *Liaoshi*, Abaoji was elected as the khaghan of the Qidan confederation by the chieftains of the Qidan-Xianbei tribes in December 906, and acclaimed the emperor (即皇帝位) of Qidan in January 907. Three months later, on April 18, the ex-Huang Chao general of lowly peasant origin named Zhu Wen deposed the Tang emperor, and made himself emperor (自立爲帝) of Liang. Abaoji began to use the reign title, Shence (神冊), in February 916. The name of Great Liao for the state was adopted in 937 (國號大遼).²⁰ Standen (2007: 8) states: "If we see the Liao as one —indeed, the most politically successful— of the many successor states to the Tang, it makes perfect sense for it to begin as the Tang ends. The Liao were as much a product of the late Tang as were the Five Dynasties." Abaoji, Kuhn (2009: 22) writes, "built a Supreme Capital though he and the Qidan nobles continued their nomadic practice of touring their territory, living in yurts, and ruling from temporary residences (*nabo*) according to the season."

The rulers of the Five Dynasties, while claiming imperial status, "sought accommodation or peaceful relations, or even acknowledged Liao overlordship," says Standen (2007: 8). Li Cunxu had "sent his aunt and uncle as hostages to the Liao court (ibid: 72)." When Li Cunxu established the Shatuo Tang dynasty in 923, the "cordial intercourt relations" with the Qidan "allowed both rulers to expand in other directions" until their deaths in 926 (ibid: 74).²⁰ Li Cunxu conquered Shu (Sichuan) in 925, and Abaoji conquered Parhae (Bohai) in January 926.

THE QIDAN UNIFY MANCHURIA BEFORE OCCUPYING NORTH CHINA

In the early years of Abaoji's time (901-9), Abaoji had mounted a series of campaigns against the Shiwei in northern Manchuria, and could incorporate some of the Shiwei tribes into

became rulers of two sedentary oasis city-states (Qocho and Beshbaliq) in Turkestan, and transformed themselves from the nomadic protector-extortioner into the international middlemen, trading horses and jade for silk, and leading a settled life. The Uighurs invented their own script by improving the Sogdian alphabetic script.

¹⁶ See Janhunen (1996: 145).

According to Fairbank and Goldman (1992: 113), the Qidan had been only semi-nomadic, relying to some extent on agricultural crops, especially millet. According to Twitchett and Tietze (1994: 57), the Qidan had begun to practice more advanced agriculture, to foster the production of iron and salt, and to encourage weaving under the chieftainship of Abaoji's father, Salati.

¹⁷ See Grousset (1970: 133-134).

Twitchett and Tietze (1994: 46) note that "the Qidan may have spoken either a proto-Mongolian language influenced by Tungusic vocabulary or a Tungusic language influenced by Mongolian vocabulary, in either case using many Turkic loan words." The Qidans created the large Qidan script of characters (logogram) in 920 by adapting the Chinese script to the highly inflected Qidan language; and then created a small script (phonogram, representing sounds which, taken together, formed a word) in 925 by adapting the Uighur alphabet. In 1922, two inscriptions in Qidan writing dating to the early twelfth century were discovered in Mongolia.

¹⁸ 遼史 卷三十七 志第七 地理志一
遼國其先曰契丹 本鮮卑之地… 上京
道 上京臨潢府 本漢遼東郡西安平
之地…名曰皇都

遼史 卷四十九 志第十八 禮志一
遼本朝鮮故壤 箕子八條之教 流風
遺俗 蓋有存者 [Ki-ja/Jiji]

遼史卷一 本紀第一 太祖上 …姓耶
律氏…字阿保機 母夢日墮懷中有娠

The *Liaoshi* states that the mother of
Abaoji became pregnant after she
dreamed that the sun sank into her lap.

The *Samguk-sagi* and *Samguk-yusa*
state that the mother of Chumong, the
founder of Koguryeo, became pregnant

by the sunlight that clasped her and
cast its rays over her body. The “light
conception motif” was shared also by
the Tuoba. (Refer to the sidenotes 44
and 45 of Chapter 4.) The Mongols (of
the Qidan-Xianbei provenance)
believed that Chinggis Khan was
conceived “by a ray of light which
penetrated through the rooflight of the
tent.” Ratchnevsky (1991: 17)

¹⁹ See Standen (2007: 68-9, 71),
Twitchett and Tietze (1994: 56-67), and
Wittfogel and Fêng (1949: 573-7).
The Qidans did not have surnames.

²⁰ The dynasty’s name became Qidan
in 983, and then in 1066 the name was
changed back to Liao.

²¹ Twitchett and Tietze (1994: 60, 65)

²² 遼史 卷三十 本紀 第三十 天祚
皇帝四 耶律大石…[1125] 遣書回鶻
王…曰 昔我太祖…北征…詔爾祖…

the Qidan confederation while, Xu (2005: 183) notes, “some other Shiwei tribes started their migration westward.” Biran (2005: 15) states that “the rise of the Liao shifted many Turkic tribes westward where they started making their way into the Middle East, and likewise brought the ancestors of Chinggis Khan to Mongolia.”

Abaoji (r.907-26) launched an attack on Mongolia in 912, and also led a great expedition into the steppe in 924, conquering northern Mongolia around the Orkhon River. He also established his sovereignty over the Uighurs/Turks, who had settled in the Gansu corridor. ²¹ Grousset (1970: 128) notes that Abaoji offered the Uighur/Turks the opportunity to reoccupy the Orkhon region, but the Uighurs, “having adopted sedentary ways, rejected the idea of a return to nomadic life.” ²²

Abaoji conquered Parhae (Bohai) in 926, just before his death at the age of fifty-four, unifying virtually the whole of Manchuria. After conquering Parhae, instead of annexing its territory, Abaoji made it a vassal kingdom by changing its name to Eastern Qidan State (*Dongdan*). Abaoji appointed his 28-year old eldest son (Bei 倍/耶律突欲/讓國皇帝/東丹王 899-936), named his successor in 916, as its king.²³ Twitchett and Tietze (1994: 66) note: “Why Abaoji acted so cautiously toward Parhae is not entirely clear. …[H]e may…have wished to avoid antagonizing its numerous and potentially hostile population.” The Parhae retained a great degree of autonomy under their own leaders and paid tribute as vassals rather than taxes as subjects until the early eleventh century [120 years later in 1046], when they were fully incorporated into the Liao system of government (ibid: 79).²⁴

The defeat of Parhae in 926, Ledyard (1983: 346) says, “was the final blow to Korean pretensions to the territory north of the Yalu…and…its defeat takes Korea out of Manchuria for the rest of history up to the present time.” The ephemeral Former Yan (337-70) was able to occupy only the Liaoxi and Liaodong, without conquering the Koguryeo, before launching their attacks on North China. The Northern Wei (386-534) was unable to occupy even the Liaodong before conquering North China in 439. The Qidans, however, had conquered the Parhae and unified almost all of Manchuria before occupying North China. Hence Ledyard (1983: 323) says: “Unlike the earlier case, in which the various [Xianbei] Yan states and Koguryeo had ended up in a

standoff, the Qidans now quickly disposed of their eastern Manchurian rival, Parhae. Thus, for the first time in history, all of Manchuria, east and west, was controlled by a single state.”

Breaking the custom, Empress Dowager Yingtian (述律/應天皇太后 879-953) who had participated in the Abaoji's campaign against Parhae together with her eldest son Bei, refused to be buried alongside her husband. She instead cut off her hand and had it placed in Abaoji's tomb. In command of her own army of horsemen, she took control of all military and civil affairs, and enabled Abaoji's second son, then 24-year old Deguang (Taizong 德光/堯骨 r.927-47), to succeed to the throne. Bei fled to Later Tang in 930. According to Twitchett and Tietze (1994: 68-9), Deguang “had distinguished himself on the battlefield during the invasion of Hebei in 921-2 and played a major role as a commander in the western campaign of 924-5.” Deguang mounted an expedition against the Tangut tribes in 933; personally led 50,000 cavalry force to destroy the Later Tang army near Taiyuan, acquiring the Sixteen Prefectures in 936 from the founder of Shatuo Jin dynasty as a payment for his help; adopted a new dynastic name, Liao, in 937; conquered Jin and occupied Kaifeng for three months in early 947; and died shortly thereafter on his way back to the north.

The eldest son of Bei, who had refused to follow his father and instead accompanied Deguang on the southern expedition of 947, became the third emperor, Shizong (院/兀欲/世宗 b.918/r.947-51), but was replaced five years later by the Deguang's eldest son (璟/述律/穆宗 Muzong r.951-69). Muzong, however, was succeeded by the Bei's line (the second son of Shizong 景宗/賢) to remain there until the end of the dynasty.²⁵

The Qidans established their Western Capital at Datong, and Southern Capital at Yanjing (Beijing), now the administrative center for the entire settled region of the Han Chinese. Liao came to occupy Manchuria, Mongolia, and the northeastern part of China (adding the Hedong region, east of the Yellow River, by 1076), stretching from the borders of Korea in the east to the Altai Mountains in the west, and monopolizing direct communication with Central and Western Asia. China inherited from Qidan the medieval European name Cathay (Kitaia, Cathaia), the name that still remains the standard designation for China throughout the Slavonic world, including Russia.

汝思故國耶 朕卽爲汝復之...爾祖卽表謝...以爲遷國于此 十有餘世 軍民皆安土重遷 不能復返矣

²³ The Liao Eastern Capital at Liaoyang came to control the former Parhae territories, while the Southern Capital at Beijing controlled the Yan-Yun region.

遼史 卷一 本紀第一 太祖...姓耶律氏...字阿保機...天顯元年[926]...平渤海...太祖崩 皇后攝軍國事...三年...詔...遷東丹民以實東平 其民或亡入新羅女直 因詔困乏不能遷者
遼史 卷七十二 列傳第二 義宗 名倍 小字圖欲 太祖長子...從征渤海...破之 改其國曰東丹...以倍爲...主之... 建元甘露 稱制 置左右大次四相及百官 一用漢法 歲貢布十五萬端 馬千匹 上諭曰 此地瀕海 非可久居 留汝撫治...太宗旣立[927]...唐...迎倍 [930]...後明宗養子...弒其君[閔帝]自立 倍密報太宗曰 從珂弒君盍討之 及太宗立石敬瑭爲晉主...從珂遣壯士[936]...害之 時年三十八

Bei, who had gone over to the Later Tang, informed Deguang in 934 that the opportunity for invasion was ripe. Hence he was killed by the last Later Tang ruler (Li Siyuan's adopted son, Li Chongke, who had usurped the throne in 934) in 936.

²⁴ 遼史 卷十九 本紀第十九 興宗二重熙十五年 [1046] 渤海部以契丹例通括軍馬

²⁵ See also Standen (2007: 7) and Kuhn (2009: 23).

²⁶ The term for the residence or camp of a ruler is *ordo* in Mongolian and *ordu* in Turkic. *Ordo* was known in both Xiongnu and Xianbei societies (ibid: 508-9). Frank and Twitchett (1994: 22) note that: “Not only the emperor but also the...empress and princess...had their own *ordo*” which included servants, retainers, and dignitaries.

遼史 卷三十一 志第一 營衛志上...
居有宮衛 謂之斡魯朵...立國規模...
太祖曰弘義宮 應天皇后曰長寧宮
太宗曰永興宮 世宗曰積慶宮 穆宗
曰延昌宮 景宗曰彰愍宮 承天太后
曰崇德宮 聖宗曰興聖宮 興宗曰延
慶宮 道宗曰太和宮 天祚曰永昌宮
又孝文皇太弟有敦睦宮 丞相耶律隆
運[韓德讓]有文忠王府 凡州三十八
...爲正戶八萬 藩漢轉戶十二萬三千
共二十萬三千戶

遼史 卷三十四 志 第四 兵衛志上
兵制 凡民年十五以上 五十以下 隸
兵籍 每正軍一名 馬三疋 打草穀
守營鋪家丁 [forager, orderly] 各一人
人鐵甲九事..馬甲皮鐵...弓四箭四百
長短槍..斧鉞...皆自備...人馬不給糧
草 日遣打草穀騎四出抄略以供之...
州縣起漢人鄉兵...隨軍專伐園林 填
道路 御寨及諸營壘..軍退 縱火焚之

²⁷ 遼史 卷三十五 志第五 兵衛志中
遼太祖宗室盛強...宮衛內虛 經營四
方...皇后述律氏居守之際 摘藩漢精
銳爲屬珊軍 太宗益選天下精甲...大
帳皮室軍 太宗置 凡三十萬騎 屬珊
軍 地皇后置 二十萬騎 宮衛騎軍
太祖...乃立斡魯朵法裂州縣 割戶丁
...世建宮衛 入則居守...不待調發州
縣 部族 十萬騎軍已立具矣...兵甲

While the Shatuo Turks, the founders of three out of the Five Dynasties, had failed to institutionalize an administrative apparatus for an enduring conquest dynasty, Qidan-Xianbei Liao became the successful and legitimate successor to the series of Xianbei conquest dynasties, namely, the Yan dynasty of Murong-Xianbei, and the Northern Wei, Western Wei, Northern Zhou, Sui, and Tang dynasties of Tuoba-Xianbei.

2. Ordo and Tribal Armies with the Dual Government System

THE SUPRA-TRIBAL ORDO AND THE TRIBAL ARMIES

Wittfogel and Fêng (1949: 559) quote the *Liaoshi*: “Under the military system of the Liao empire, all persons between fifteen and fifty years of age were placed on a military register. Each regular [zhèng 正] soldier had three horses, one forager [打草穀], and one orderly.”²⁶ The Qidan tribes were mobilized to serve in the military units called *ordo* (斡魯朵 *wu-lu-duo* from which derives “horde”), the backbone of the Liao military system, or in the local tribal armed forces (部族軍).²⁷

Sometime after 922, Abaoji had created a supra-tribal *ordo* as a personal bodyguard army and an enlarged household management service organization of the emperor (宮衛騎軍). According to Wittfogel and Fêng (1949: 515-6), the Liao “*ordos* developed from a personal body guard into a ‘guard’ army, elite [shock] troops similar to the *garde* regiments of Napoleon.” The “total number of *ordo* horsemen at the close of the Liao dynasty” amounted to 101,000 “mounted soldiers” from 203,000 *ordo* households with 408,000 adult males. These figures represent the “maximum” totals including the Qidans (正丁/戶) and the non-Qidans (the Parhae, non-Parhae barbarians, and Chinese 藩漢轉丁/戶) in the *ordos*.²⁸ A Song official named Fu Pi is quoted by Tao (1983: 78) as saying: “the Qidans had not only adopted Chinese institutions but also had a formidable military machine, which the Han Chinese did not have.”²⁹

Besides the *ordo* troops, Liao maintained the tribal armed forces and the Han Chinese militia. The tribal chieftains held both military and civil authority, and commanded a special detachment called *Jiu* (糾) for permanent guard and police duties. Unlike the tribesmen, the conscript Chinese militia men (漢人鄉兵) did not

commonly own weapons because they accompanied the Liao armies for the express purpose of cutting down trees, repairing roads, and providing auxiliary services when attacking cities. A supra-tribal *ordo* army of a hundred thousand horsemen was ready to strike before the tribal armies and militia could be mobilized. The Qidans, like the Turks and the Mongols, fought in cavalry armies that were essentially self-supporting. The tribal armed forces at the frontier garrisons numbered somewhere between seventy-five and one hundred thousand regular soldiers.³⁰

The Liao military system was very much centralized and, Standen (2007: 134) writes, “did not provide the same potential as that of the Southern regimes [Five Dynasties] for establishing regional power basis.” Few Qidan officials and warriors were stationed in the southern Chinese territories, and the grasslands of tribal regions remained the domain of the Qidan and their “barbarian” followers. According to Wittfogel and Fêng (1949: 6-7), “so completely was the army a Qidan monopoly that, until the very last, military secrets were withheld from Chinese officials.”³¹

HEREDITARY ARISTOCRACY AND HAN CHINESE CIVIL OFFICIALS

In 902-5, Abaoji had settled the displaced Han Chinese on the upper reaches of the Luan River to develop agriculture, while the captured nomadic tribesmen were used to strengthen his military force. The Chinese farmers could make his Yelü (*I-la*) tribe economically much more powerful than other tribes.

Han Yanhui, a Han Chinese from an official family of Youzhou, oversaw the settlement of displaced Chinese peasants and the establishment of a Tang-style administration for the Chinese populations (after 916) in the reign of Abaoji (r.907-26). Han was, Standen (2007) states, “given free rein to design the institutional structures of a new regime more or less from scratch” (ibid: 111), and is most famous “as the constructor of Tang-style institution in Liao” (ibid: 176).³² Another Han Chinese named Zhang Li crossed over to the Liao in 936, and served as a chief minister alongside Han Yanhui within the Liao’s Southern Administration, advising Deguang (r.926-47) that “the South should be governed by the people of Middle Kingdom.”³³

Standen (2007: 158) states that, by the time of Shizong’s rule (r.947-51), “there was no longer ... a shortage of Chinese bureaucrats in the Liao regime, and the work of establishing an

犀利 教練完習 簡天下精銳... 十二宮一府...丁四十萬八千 [正丁 十六萬 蕃漢轉丁 二十四萬八千] 出騎軍十萬一千

大首領部族軍 遼親王大臣 體國如家 征伐之際 往往置私甲以從王事 大者千餘騎 小者數百人...部族根本 衆部族分隸南北府 守衛四邊 各有司存...北部凡二十八部 南部凡一十六部

²⁸ The “minimum” total of adult males in the *ordo* households is estimated to have been 280,000: 120,000 Qidans; 60,000 non-Parhae barbarians; 40,000 Parhae; and 60,000 Han Chinese. The “minimum” totals of Liao population at the close of the dynasty are estimated (ibid: 55-8) to have been: 750,000 Qidans (40% in *ordos*); 200,000 non-Parhae barbarians (43% in *ordos*); 550,000 Parhae (18% in *ordos*); and 2,550,000 Chinese (6% in *ordos*).

²⁹ The *Liaoshi* surveys 12 *ordo* units, recording the size of the cavalry arm; the number of regular, barbarian, and Chinese households; and the tribal units and administrative districts attached to each *ordo*. When the households selected for *ordo* service remained in their original homes, the old region was recorded; when they were transferred to the *ordo* camp, no attached place of residence was recorded. Wittfogel and Fêng (1949: 510, 515).

³⁰ See Wittfogel and Fêng (1949: 512-23, 527).

³¹ See also Xu (2005: 261-2).

³² Han Yanhui (882-959) was sent as an envoy to the Qidan court by the military governor of Youzhou (Liu Shouguang 劉守光 d.914), where Abaoji detained him to perform menial labor. Empress Shulü, however, urged Abaoji to make use of Han's virtues and talents. Standen (2007: 110) writes that Han Yanhui "began to teach the Qidan how to set up a court and institute government agencies, to build city walls, and establish markets and wards in order to manage the *hanren* (漢人), causing each one to have a spouse, and to bring wasteland and abandoned fields under cultivation ... which would in turn improve tax returns."

遼史 卷七十四 列傳第四 韓延徽... 燕帥劉仁恭...授幽州觀察度支使... 來聘 太祖怒其不屈 留之 述律后諫曰...賢者也 奈何困辱之...太宗朝... 爲政事令...世宗朝 遷南府宰相 建政事省 設張理具...太祖初元 庶事草創 凡榮都邑 建宮殿 正君臣 定名分 法度井井 延徽力也

³³ 遼史 卷七十六 列傳第六 張礪...初仕唐爲...翰林學士...入契丹... 從太宗伐晉[947]...諸將...殺掠 礪奏曰 今大遼始得中國 宜以中國人治之 不可專用國人及左右近習...則人心不服...上不聽...朋...蕭翰...曰 汝何故於先帝言國人不可爲節度使... 礪憤卒[d.947]

³⁴ See also Standen (2007: 108-116, 124, 137, 168). "Zhong (忠) now meant hierarchical loyalty" (ibid: 174).

administrative apparatus for which the earliest arrivals were enlisted had been...completed by 947."³⁴ There were plenty of talented frontier Han Chinese literati and ex-officials who were accustomed to seizing opportunities in such a chaotic era, transgressing ethnic boundaries of allegiance, and willing to serve with "unbounded loyalty" any new alien conquest dynasty without ever feeling morally uncomfortable.³⁵

Twitchett and Tietze (1994: 77) state that "the most striking feature of Liao administration was the dual system of government." The Liao rulers implemented a mutually-independent dualistic form of administration, with a Northern Administration "responsible for the Qidan and tribal peoples, wherever they lived" and a Southern Administration, organized on the Tang model, "responsible for the Han Chinese population [wherever they lived], as had been the Chinese office (*Han-er si* 漢兒司) that Abaoji had set up in his early years."³⁶ It was indeed "a dual state." The southern area of three million Chinese in sixteen prefectures was governed by the Chinese-style bureaucracy staffed almost entirely by the Han Chinese, who were the talented literati or ex-officials captured by or voluntarily allied themselves with the Liao at first, and then by the gentry elites who were recruited through recommendations, examinations, and hereditary *yin* privileges. The Han Chinese, in the words of Wittfogel and Fêng (1949: 454), "even held a number of high positions in the northern government." The important decisions were, of course, a preserve for the Qidan officers at the court.³⁷

The northern area of less than one million Qidan people was governed by traditional tribal law.³⁸ More telling, perhaps, was the fact that the officials of the Southern Administration, including the Liao emperor, dressed in Chinese style, while the officials of the Northern Administration, including the Empress Dowager, the arch-representative of the old tribal ways, dressed in the traditional Qidan style.³⁹

The Qidan rulers continued the dual government system until the end of the Liao dynasty, recruiting Han Chinese civil administrators from the gentry families through examinations as early as Deguang's reign. They established an examination hall in the Southern Capital in 977 (in the reign of Jingzong, r.969-82); gave the first (Sui-Tang style) *Jinshi* examination (held 54 times in the Southern Capital until the end of the dynasty producing about

2,000 Han Chinese graduates) exclusively for the Han Chinese in 988; and maintained their own *Hanlin* academy. The candidates were examined in poetry and the classics.⁴⁰

The *History of Jin* states that Liao arose as a successor to Tang (遼起唐季), and hence the Liao government “chose its men by means of the *Jinshi* system of Tang ... [but] employed only two or three out of every ten persons who had passed the final tests. ... [O]nly a fraction of the officials...held the *Jinshi* degree.”⁴¹ According to Wittfogel and Fêng (1949: 455-6), the number of persons who passed the metropolitan examinations amounted to only around 20 (less than 30 at the maximum) per annum on average, but Han Chinese of literary attainment were give places in the empire’s bureaucratic hierarchy on the basis of official recommendation without taking the *Jinshi* degree. The scions of high Chinese officials had also enjoyed the hereditary (*jin*) privilege of entry to office.⁴² And yet, Twitchett and Tietze state (1994: 92), the examination system carried, as it did in the Sui-Tang dynasties, the “symbolic significance as the public adoption of one of the normative activities of a regular Chinese dynasty.”

The Qidans were employed under the traditional system of “hereditary succession to office (*shixuan* 世選).”⁴³ According to Wittfogel and Fêng (1949: 461), Liao was dominated by the tribal aristocracy “which traditionally considered political positions in terms of hereditary prerogatives.” Hereditary officials, including the position of ministry chiefs, were in principle appointed to specific offices from specific families or certain lineages of specific clans according to the rule of hereditary selection (ibid: 450-1).⁴⁴ The “tribal system of hereditary officials (*shiguan* 世官),” however, did not “assign a position to a specific heir. ... [It permitted] considerable scope for the evaluation of personal differences and qualifications within a general frame of stratification and privilege (ibid: 454).”

Twitchett and Tietze (1994: 79-80) write that “Liao emperors were constantly on the move ... personally to make all the important decisions ... On these peregrinations he was accompanied by most of the great officers of the Northern Administration ... By contrast, only a handful of officials from the Southern Administration --a single prime minister and a small group of secretaries and drafting officials-- formed a part of his regular entourage. ... Thus the Southern Administration was

³⁵ Prominent collaborators (such as 韓德讓/耶律隆運, 王繼忠, 陳昭袞) were honored with the imperial surname, Yelü (賜國姓), and treated as the aristocratic Qidan.

³⁶ 遼史 卷四十五 志第十五 百官志一 太祖神冊六年[921] 詔正班爵... 官分南北 以國制治契丹 以漢制待漢人 國制簡朴... 北面治宮帳部族屬國之政 南面治漢人州縣 租賦軍馬之事... 因俗而治...

³⁷ Wittfogel and Fêng (1949: 195) note that the “power of the Chinese officials was restrained by the overlordship of an alien group of conquerors who, while willing to delegate numerous administrative functions, were equally eager not to delegate the essentials of political and military power.”

³⁸ Fairbank and Goldman (1992:113) See Wittfogel and Fêng (1949: 55-8) for the estimated population.

³⁹ Twitchett and Tietze (1994: 77) note that Taizong ordered that “the officials of the Northern Administration and the empress dowager wear Qidan costume and that the officials of the Southern Administration and the emperor himself dress in Chinese style.”

遼史 卷五十六 志第二十五 儀衛志二 國服 會同中 太后 北面臣僚 國服 皇帝 南面臣僚 漢服

⁴⁰ See Twitchett and Tietze (1994: 91-2) and Kuhn (2009: 25). In the final chaotic days of the Liao dynasty, it

seems that a Qidan person could also receive the *Jinshi* degree, as did Yelü Dashi (耶律大石) in 1115.

⁴¹ “*Selection of Officials* (選舉)” section in the *History of Jin* quoted by Wittfogel and Fêng (1949: 454-6).

金史 卷五十一 志第三十二 選舉一
在漢之世 雖有賢良方正諸科以取士
而推擇為吏...公卿子弟入備宿衛 因
被寵遇...遼起唐季 頗用唐進士法取
人 然仕於其國者 考其致身之所自
進士纔十之二三耳 金承遼後 凡事
欲軼遼世

⁴² Wittfogel and Fêng (1949: 461) note: “De-rang (德讓/耶律隆運), son of the chancellor Han Kuang-si (韓匡嗣), obtained office (北部宰相/大丞相)... without passing an examination [and] opened the way for many of his relatives to achieve leading positions ... [without passing the] examination.... [N]or are any of the descendants of the first famous Liao Chinese, Han Yanhui (韓延徽), known to have held a *jinshi*.”

⁴³ See Twitchett and Tietze (ibid: 92). When the Murong and the Tuoba founded conquest dynasties, they also graced the meritorious generals (功臣) with noble titles and let their legitimate sons inherit high (大官世選) and low (小官世選) government positions.

⁴⁴ 遼史 卷四十五 志第十五 百官志一 太祖神冊六年[921] 北宰相府 掌佐理軍國之大政 皇族四帳世預其選...南宰相府 掌...軍國之大政 國舅五帳世預其選

essentially an executive organizations for the southern areas and their settled populations. The high-sounding titles of its officers should not conceal the fact that routine decision making and all military authority were concentrated in the emperor’s Qidan entourage drawn from the Northern Administration.” The southern officials were specifically excluded from decisions on military affairs at court.

BUDDHISM REACHES ITS PEAK IN LIAO

Kuhn (2009: 115) explains that, in Liao, “the shamanistic rituals of the tribe still flourished. The Qidan worshipped the sun, venerated the tribal ancestress and the spirits of the ancestors, made...sacrifices...” Buddhism was, however, an “imperial religion” that was compatible with their cherished tribal beliefs.

The devotion to Buddhism by Abaoji and Deguang was well documented in the *Liaoshi*. Deguang’s reign was characterized by great activity in the printing of Buddhist texts. Dunnell (1996: 48) notes: “Xingzong (r.1031-55) was celebrated...as a bodhisattva and *cakravartin* (a king who turns the wheel of the law)...[A] stele was erected...likening the Liao sovereign to a bodhisattva of unbounded powers, who had inherited the wisdom of the Golden Wheel.” According to Kuhn (2009: 115), “Daozong (r.1055-1101) participated in discussions on Buddhist doctrine and ordered the heir apparent to copy Buddhist texts.” According to Wittfogel and Fêng (1949: 292), the Liao rulers “continued to pay lip service to Confucianism, but within the Qidan world only a limited group favored this doctrine whose anti-barbarian overtones were still resented by the northern nobility in the Jin period.”

The Buddhist scriptures were used in educating the heir apparent. In the Liao dynasty, it was the Buddha’s birthday, not the birthday of Confucius, that was included in the list of national festivals. The registered number of monks and nuns increased from about 50,000 in 942 to 360,000 in 1078. The most powerful and wealthy ruling clans in the Liao empire made enormous gifts to the temples. The Buddhist temples were engaged in charitable activities such as granaries for the poor, charity schools, and lending grain at low nominal interest rates. Of course, there also were excesses, such as leasing land and then enslaving the tenants; lending money at exorbitant interest rates; indulging in licentiousness on the part of monks; avoiding military service and

payment of taxes; and wasting enormous resources for the construction of temples.⁴⁵

THE MYTH OF ASSIMILATION

The Han Chinese and many western scholars assert that the Qidan conquerors soon became sinicized (and hence civilized); and that their rule, that of a typically Chinese dynasty, was “dominated” by the Han Chinese literati-officials. The Qidan rulers, however, not only monopolized military authority but made all the important routine decisions; continued to maintain the center of their political and military power in their old tribal territory of northern Jehol (上京臨潢府); never abandoned their typically tribal political and military organization nor their secular traditions or religious beliefs; and let the mass of the Qidan people continue to pursue their pastoral activities.⁴⁶

Wittfogel (1957: 326) contends that “comparative analysis shows that none of the four major conquest dynasties of China [Liao, Jin, Yuan, and Qing] confirms the myth of absorption, not even the last.”⁴⁷ The conquerors from the Mongolian steppes or Manchuria resisted sinification.⁴⁸ While preserving their own tribal tradition, they let the Chinese people maintain their own way of life, allowing the cultural heritage of Chinese civilization to survive. Different rules were applied to their Han subjects, but that did not mean the Han Chinese were misgoverned. According to Franke and Twitchett (1994: 39), “the Han Chinese...never once rose up against the Qidan, and at the very end, when the southern Han Chinese section of the Liao came under threat simultaneously from the Song and the Nüzhen, the population fiercely resisted the Song and then gave up the Southern Capital to the Nüzhen without even token resistance.”⁴⁹

3. Han Chinese Song: the Age of Confucian Rule

BIRTH OF THE HAN CHINESE SONG DYNASTY: NATIVE INTERLUDE

The sudden death of the Emperor Shizong (954-9) of the last of the Five Dynasties (後周 951-60) put a six-year-old boy on the throne. The Han Chinese commander of the Palace Corps, Zhao Kuangyin (趙匡胤 r.960-76) was elevated to emperor

遼史 卷一 本紀第一 太祖上 四年 [910] 以后兄蕭敵魯爲北府宰相 后族爲相自此始

The emperor clan Yelü (耶律) and the empress clan Xiao (蕭) had constituted the two royal clans and monopolized the highest Liao government positions, the Yelü clan heading the Northern Chancellery and the Xiao clan heading the Southern chancellery.

⁴⁵ Wittfogel and Fêng (1949: 294-6)

“A set of the newly printed Liao Canon was presented to the king of Koryeo in 1063; another set followed in 1074 (ibid: 294).” Daozong composed and copied Buddhist texts with his own hand.

⁴⁶ See Wittfogel and Fêng (1949: 4-5) and Twitchett and Tietze (1994: 79-80). Wittfogel and Fêng (1949: 7) note that the Qidan soldiers continued to depend upon fermented mare's milk or *kumiss* for their main nourishment. When Liao collapsed, “most of those who left their homesteads drove their carts either into the western borderlands or eastward into the camps of the ... Nüzhen.”

⁴⁷ Obviously, Wittfogel's contention is rejected by most Han Chinese scholars, who believe that the “nomadic and seminomadic barbarians” have always been assimilated into Chinese civilization (though occasionally leaving some marks on it), eventually becoming integral parts of the Chinese people and Chinese history, as manifested by the reality of the now People's Republic of China.

⁴⁸ Mote (1999: 47) quotes a statement made by Abaoji and recorded by Yao Kun (姚坤) who was dispatched by Mingzong of Later Tang (Li Keyong's stepson, Siyuan) in June 926 in order to report the death of Zhuangzong (Mingzong's stepbrother, Cunxu) to the Liao court: "I can speak Chinese, but I never speak it in the presence of my tribal people. I fear that they may emulate the Chinese and grow soft and timid."

⁴⁹ Lorge (2005a: 64) notes that, when Hailing (r.1149-61) of the Jin dynasty launched an offensive against Southern Song across the Huai River in 1161, "most Chinese people did not respond to the Song calls" for an uprising.

⁵⁰ Eberhard (2005: 187-8) Kuhn (2009: 31-2) notes that the native home of Taizu was in Zhuo district of Hebei and that he was born in the Jiema garrison of Luoyang: "A modest man who detested luxury... he sympathized with the common people ... and concerned himself with the economic well-being of the nation."

⁵¹ See Wittfogel and Fêng (1949: 6-7). Wang Jizhong (王繼忠) was a Song general captured by the Liao army in 1003. Wang argued the benefits of a peace, and drafted the letters asking the Song to send envoys to negotiate. See Standen (2007: 158-168).

⁵² See Barfield (1989: 174), Jagchid and Symons (1969: 132), and Twitchett and Tietze (1994: 109, 122).

by his troops in 960. Song Taizu turned at once against the kingdoms in the south, leaving the north of China in the hands of the Qidan, the "not exactly an heroic policy."⁵⁰ The easy conquest of south was possible by purchasing peace with the Qidan.

After a thirty-year war against the Song, the Liao rulers abandoned their dream of conquering South China. They had to satisfy themselves with the territory acquired by Deguang from the Shatuo Jin rulers that included Datong and Beijing.⁵¹ The Qidans launched an attack on the Song in 1004, and concluded the Shanyuan peace treaty (on January 13-8, 1005) which called for the Song to deliver to the frontier prefecture of Xiongzhou 100,000 bolts of silver and 200,000 taels of silk annually to the Qidans. The treaty of 1042 increased the annual payments to 200,000 *liang* of silver and 300,000 *pi* of silk. The Song court was made to accept inferior status and continue to pay "tribute (貢)" in the name of a contribution to the Liao's military expenses. Stable relations (defined as the "relationship of equality" by Chinese historians) were maintained only because the Song were willing to present vast amounts of Chinese wealth annually to the Qidans, as well as to the Xi Xia (982-1038-1227) after 1044.⁵²

CONFUCIAN SCHOLAR-GENTRY REPLACE HEREDITARY ARISTOCRACY

Kuhn (2009: 1) states that "the 'old world' of the northern hereditary aristocratic families, with genealogies going back hundreds of years, finally vanished in the turmoil ... A newly emerging class of scholar-officials, trained in Confucian doctrine and graduated in a competitive civil service examination system, was...to take on responsibility for reshaping Chinese tradition"⁵³

The conquest dynasties had relied on the Xianbei aristocracy and, as collaborators, the Han Chinese gentry-officials. Hence Kuhn (2009: 1) says: "During the Song dynasty, a new self-consciousness and self-esteem took shape among the people who identified themselves as descendants of the Han Chinese. The social system they invented during the Song [dynasty] became the paradigm for what Chinese and Westerners of the twentieth century would refer to as 'traditional China.'"

The Han empire (206 BCE-220 CE) was, according to Kuhn (2009: 2-3), "built on a foundation of territorial and administrative unification laid by the Qin dynasty (221-206 BCE). The Tang empire (618-907) profited from the consolidating

achievements of the Sui dynasty (581-618). But the Song rulers faced a different and more difficult situation. The dynasty's founder, Emperor Taizu, did not find the same sort of well-prepared ground...that the Sui had bequeathed to the Tang. He and his brother successor, Emperor Taizong (r.976-97), ... third emperor, Zhenzong (r.997-1022) ... understood that they must create precedents ... [They] deliberately strengthened the civil principle over the military principle. This new order was sustained by the rise of a class of elite civil servants who were chosen on the basis of a nationwide examination in the Confucian classics. Getting a classical education became the key to a career of influence, privilege, wealth, power, and...fame. New officials were recruited from the children of the scholar-official elite, the land-owning gentry, and wealthy merchant families” who could afford the costly and time-consuming Confucian education.⁵⁴

After 973, the administration of the Song prefectures began to be transferred from the potentially dangerous military men to civil officials recruited through the Confucian examination system who, Bol (1992: 52) writes, “were willing subordinates, without independent power” base, and “depended on a superior authority for their political position.” The authority to command entire armies was taken away from regional commanders and given to civil officials of the central government.⁵⁵

The focus of examinations shifted away from literary skills and poetry to skill in Confucian thinking on matters of statecraft. Kuhn (2009: 129-31) states: “the parallel-style prose [characterized by the syntactical parallelism, allusions, and refined diction]...was pushed into the background by the nonpoetic ancient-style prose [that] is tightly linked to Confucian learning.” The scholar-officials sought in the Confucian canon the ways to diagnose the crises of their time and the formulas for their solution. The Song *jīnshì* exam emphasized substance over style.

The Tang had been dominated by the landed aristocracy. There was now vastly increased upward social mobility among the Chinese landed gentry.⁵⁶ “Starting in the Tang dynasty as a modest mechanism to broaden the social base for selecting officials,” Elman (1991) states, “civil examinations under the Song dynasty became a powerful *educational gyroscope*”: the examinations and Confucian learning, not the hereditary aristocracy, became the passport to “to serve the imperial state at its highest echelons of

遼史 卷十四 本紀第十四 聖宗五
統和二十二年 [1004] 南伐...宋遣...
請和 以太后爲叔母 願歲輸銀十萬
兩 絹二十萬匹 卷十九 本紀第十九
興宗二 重熙十一年 [1042] 宋遣富
弼...宋歲增銀絹十萬兩匹 文書稱貢
Kuhn (2007: 8) notes that “Four times
before the final collapse--in 1005, 1123,
1142, and 1208--the Song accepted
humiliating treaties that downgraded
the dynasty to vassal status...
Pragmatic chief counselors...convinced
the emperors that paying annual
subsidies to the alien regimes was far
more economical than financing long-
lasting war campaigns with uncertain
outcomes.”

⁵³ Kuhn (2009: 276) states that the
“competence, and dedication of Song
officials distinguished them...from their
aristocratic predecessors in the Tang
dynasty.”

⁵⁴ Kuhn (2009: 39) notes that, in 973,
Taizu initiated a palace examination
under his own personal supervision,
and awarded about 350 *jīnshì* degrees
during his rule: “Throughout Taizong’s
tenure, 5,816 candidates [10,000
according to Jin (2000: 163)], many of
them from humble backgrounds,
became degree holders. [In 1000 CE
during Zhengzong’s] reign, the number
of degree-holders who passed the final
(*jīnshì*) examinations... reached 1,583.”

⁵⁵ Standen (2007: 97) notes that “the
first two Song emperors succeeded in
separating military command from

administrative jurisdiction so that governors no longer controlled the empire's best armies." See also Fairbank and Goldman (1992: 88).

⁵⁶ Fairbank and Goldman (1992: 94-5) note that "the establishment of official families...found special ways to get degrees for their sons ... by the *yin* privilege ... by passing various special ...examinations outside the regular competition, and, most amazingly, by simply taking the examinations and failing them time after time!" The gentry's aim "was to preserve the family's elite status by training sons to become...degree-holders (ibid: 103)." The government also sold "the lowest literary degrees [allowing] men of wealth [to] rise for a price into the upper class (ibid: 104-5)." Kuhn (2009: 124) quotes the findings by E. A. Kracke that "approximately 57 percent of the successful candidates originated from families without a father, grandfather, or great grandfather in the official ranks."

⁵⁷ The "Cheng-Zhu (程朱) *Daoxue* (道學)" designates the philosophy of the Cheng brothers (程顥 Hao 1032-85/程頤 Yi 1033-1107) of Northern Song that was later synthesized by Zhu Xi (朱熹 1130-1200) of Southern Song and came to be called Neo-Confucianism.

⁵⁸ Lee (ibid: 126) says that the official recognition and sponsorship were considered to be a great honor, and "developed further when Mongolian rulers controlled the appointment of

power." Unlike the practice in Sui and Tang, Franke (1972: 6) emphasizes, "no recommendations were required" to take exams in Song. As a status group, the civil service scholar-official families formed the *bureaucratized gentry-literatus* (*shidafu*). The landless lower classes, however, were effectively eliminated from officialdom.

To meet the educational needs of the common people, the number of private *shuyuan* (書院) established by local families rapidly increased. The limited size of the bureaucracy, Bol (1992: 333) says, "made it impossible for most *shi* (士), once they gained office, to make office holding the long-term family occupation. ... Few made government their full-time career. ... Government service was seldom a career possibility." In no time, however, there appeared in Northern Song the *Daoxue* (*Learning of the Way*) of Cheng brothers preaching that "the primary goal" of learning should be self-cultivation and sage-like ethical conduct according to what one has learned.⁵⁷

The *shuyuan*, as an institution to prepare students for the exams as well as for learning for one's own sake, supplemented and even supplanted the government-managed local (prefectural and county) schools. Imperial "plaques were awarded to various academies," and "all the famous academies in the Northern Song received officially printed classics or land from the government," notes Lee (1994: 126).⁵⁸ Zhu Xi of Southern Song, born in Fujian, believed that the institution of *shuyuan* would, Lee (ibid: 136) writes, "incorporate the educated elite, the literati, in and out of office, into the state and local-community continuum."

Through Confucian education, most of the landed-gentry families transformed themselves into, first of all, influential local literati and, for the chosen few, the privileged scholar-official families.⁵⁹ In the Northern Song dynasty, most of the village level public functions, performed by local government officials down to the early Tang, began to be taken over by the local gentry-scholars who were licensed to undertake the local management function by receiving their examination degree. Their brokerage function in local administration extended into the allocation and collection of taxes (keeping the above-quota collections as personal fees) as well as all sorts of public works. The 20,000-man imperial bureaucracy withdrew from local affairs. The Song provincial officials administered the villages in close cooperation with the landed-gentry literati. By taking over the responsibility for

moral and economic welfare of local society, the *shizhu* (士族) members could survive without attaining government office.

The traditional Han Chinese Confucianism eventually appropriated select ideals (such as ethical universalism, compassion, and individual salvation) of Buddhism to be reborn as Neo-Confucianism “which could,” in the words of Chen (1964: 395), “serve as counterarguments to the Buddhist way of life and doctrines” in the form of a newly formulated “system of ethic and metaphysics,” and hence “marked a return by the Chinese thinkers to their own cultural heritage.”

In the Han Chinese dynasties of Song and Ming, the hereditary aristocratic ruling class of the conquest dynasties was completely replaced by the scholar-officials through the Neo-Confucian civil examination system, and consequently few scholar-intellectuals cared to become monks. The withdrawal of interest and patronage of the elite caused the degeneration of monastic communities and the decline of Buddhism. “Inevitably,” Wright (1959: 95) states, “many of the once great and imposing temples fell into ruins,” and “the rural clergy tended to become little more than priests of an undifferentiated folk religion [say, lay Buddhism], serving local peasant need without demanding adherence to any creed or regimen (ibid: 106).”⁶⁰

Kuhn (2009: 29) quotes a memorial submitted by Chen Liang (陳亮 1143-94) of Song: “This dynasty bases the state on Confucianism; the strengthening of Confucianism is unique among the previous dynasties (本朝以儒立國 而儒道之振 獨優於前代).” Kuhn continues: “Confucianism came to regulate not just the public behavior but the private lives of the upper class (ibid: 3) and strengthened a sense of Chineseness among the descendants of the Han that would endure for centuries (ibid: 9).”

The century and a half of the Northern Song dynasty (960-1127), with its capital at Kaifeng, the center of the transport network of the eastern plain, is admired as one the most creative periods in Chinese civilization.

4. Koryeo Unifies the Korean Peninsula

A BUDDHIST STATE RULED BY THE LANDED ARISTOCRACY

Wang Keon (b.877 r.918-43) emerged from a powerful

directors of academies....[M]ore than 60% of academies founded in the Ming times were initiated by the government.” Kuhn (2009: 127) notes that the Hall of Learning (commonly known as the Imperial University) opened in 960, and the School of the Four Gates, where students received stipends and enjoyed exemption from the prefectural exam, opened in 1043

⁵⁹ Fairbank and Goldman (1992: 104-6) Kuhn (2009) notes that those who passed the prefectural examinations, conducted in early autumn, “were qualified for employment as teachers in local or family schools, as administrators of granaries or temples, and as subofficial local administrators. ...By 1106 only about 3 percent of people taking the prefectural exam (out of 80,000) became graduates. ...In the thirteenth century...only 1 percent of candidates, or less, was allowed to pass the prefectural examination. ... [T]he examination for the *jinshi* degree ...took place in the capital once every three years (ibid: 122).”

In Southern Song times, around 6.5 percent of the prefectural degree-holders on average were able to obtain the *jinshi* degree. The total number of *jinshi* degree-holders is estimated to have been a minimum of 28,933 during the entire Song dynasty and a maximum of 70,000 between 960 and 1229 (ibid: 123).

⁶⁰ During its heyday under the conquest dynasties, Buddhism had

captured the imagination of the Han Chinese intellectuals. With a drastic increase in upward social mobility in the native Song-Ming dynasties, however, few gentry-scholar elite found refuge in Buddhism. Kuhn (2009: 110-1) states: "Many Confucian scholar-officials, [including] Ouyang Xiu, denounced Buddhist doctrine as foolish, delusional, and harmful to Chinese customs and practices... which...denied the substantiality...of the world and thus led to nihilism."

⁶¹ 高麗史節要 丙申十九年 [936] 秋九月..王率三軍至天安合兵進次一善神劔而兵逆之隔一利川而陣 王與萱觀兵而...領黑水達姑鐵勒諸蕃勁騎九千五百

⁶² The Stipend Land was allocated to officials, in lieu of salary, and the Merit Land was granted in perpetuity and cultivated by tenant farmers. There were also public lands tilled by peasants paying one-fourth of the harvest to the state.

⁶³ Wang Keon bestowed the royal surname on powerful castle lords, and formed matrimonial alliances with local clan leaders, taking six queens and 23 wives. He had concluded a marriage arrangement with the last Silla king, each marrying one of the other's daughters.

⁶⁴ In the Koryeo dynasty, over 6,000 men passed the examination that tested their ability to compose Chinese

local clan (豪族) in the Kae-seong area that had been engaged in extensive maritime commercial activities. He had at first served as a commander of the Later Koguryeo (901-18) army, and then was put forward by the generals for the kingship. He established the Koryeo dynasty (918-1392), winning the surrender of the last ruler of Silla in 935 and destroying the Later Paekche (900-36). It is recorded that, among the 86,500 soldiers mobilized by Wang Keon at his final battle against the Later Paekche in September 936, valiant Blackwater Nüzhen and Uighur Turkic cavalry soldiers made up 9,500 of them.⁶¹

Wang Keon and his immediate successors restructured the entire society and relieved the misery of the common people by establishing a more equitable land-tax system and emancipating a large number of slaves.⁶² Wang Keon broke the bone-rank order of the Silla society, and drew on hereditary aristocrats from many different clans.⁶³ Thousands of non-aristocratic provincial strongmen were named vassals of merit. A large number of local aristocratic clans, including the aristocrats of Silla's *head-rank* six lineages and the powerful clans of the Kae-seong area, participated in the central bureaucracy. This made necessary an examination system for appointment to government office. In 958, for the first time in Korean history, Koryeo adopted the Tang-style examination system (頗用唐制) to select civil officials, and also established a Chinese-style government apparatus.

As in Sui and Tang, the protected appointment system (*yim*) enabled the powerful hereditary aristocratic clans to continue dominating officialdom. Furthermore, a large number of protection beneficiaries had anyway passed the examinations because it gave greater prestige. The Sui-Tang examinations had emphasized filial piety and poetry. The Koryeo examination system did not particularly emphasize the Confucian Classics either, and had also focused on the ability to compose Chinese literary forms such as poetry, rhyme, prose, and policy essay.⁶⁴

The aristocrats monopolized the highest offices in the government, married their daughters to the monarchs, controlled extensive wealth, and dominated educational institutions. Marriages and examinations permitted some social mobility, but Koryeo was essentially a hereditary landed-aristocratic society.

Lee (1984: 132) states that Koryeo was "a thoroughly Buddhist state." The founder, Wang Keon, stated in the first of

his Ten Injunctions: “The success of the *Great Enterprise* of founding our dynasty is entirely owing to the protective powers of the many Buddhas. We therefore must build temples for both Chan (Zhen) and Textual Schools and appoint abbots to them (ibid).”⁶⁵ Koryeo established the “monk examination” system on the model of the state civil service examination, and gave clerical ranks for those who passed the examination. Monks received land allotments, and were exempt from taxes and corvée. Monasteries expanded their land holdings through donations from the royal house and aristocracy, setting up relief granaries.⁶⁶

KORYEO MILITARY MACHINE TO FIGHT AGAINST INVASIONS

Koryeo created hereditary military households (軍戶/府兵) from among the young and vigorous peasants (良人), *a la* the *jubing* system of the Western Wei, Sui and Tang. The full-time military forces of the central government consisted of 45 regiments of 1,000 soldiers each that were organized into three core combat divisions (for the defense of the frontiers and capital) with 32 regiments, one police division with 7 regiments, one honor guard division with 2 regiments, one palace (and city gates) guard division with 1 regiment, and two Royal Guards (king’s personal bodyguards) with 3 regiments. The 45,000 rank and file (of the Two Guards and Six Divisions) were mostly full-time professional soldiers (京軍) from the hereditary military clans (軍班氏族). Every professional military household was granted soldiers’ land (軍人田), and was allocated two supporting households (養戶) to cultivate its land. The provincial forces consisted of the combat-ready frontier garrison forces (兩界州鎮軍) manned by the self-supporting farmer-soldiers in the border garrison administrative units, and the constabulary militia of part-time peasant soldiers in the circuits. Total Koryeo military force in normal times was recorded to have amounted to 120,000 men.⁶⁷

The Qidans had conquered Parhae in 926. In order to prepare a defense against the possible invasion of the Liao army, King Jeong-zong (r.945-9) of Koryeo mobilized 300,000 soldiers, called the Lightning Army, and established the Lightning Army Command.⁶⁸ Schultz (2000: 6) states: “In wartime, special mobilizations, supplementing the capital armies and guards, formed into five emergency armies that were usually placed under the command of a special commander appointed for the

literary forms (such as poetry, rhyme, prose, sacrificial ode, and the problem essay), while scarcely 450 passed the examination that tested knowledge of Confucian Classics. See Lee (1984: 118-9). Duncan (2000: 278) notes that the large numbers of central aristocrats who chose to take the examination had already secured posts in the central bureaucracy. “Even eligibility to sit for the merit-based government service examinations was determined by hereditary social status (ibid: 49).”

高麗史 卷第七十三 志第二十七 科目一 光宗九年..始設科舉 試以詩賦頌及時務策取進士..明經醫卜等業

⁶⁵ Buddhism was the dominating culture of the late Silla and became the state religion of Koryeo with two major schools – Doctrinal and Meditation – providing different paths to enlightenment. The Buddhist establishment became closely intertwined with secular affairs, and became rich through vast landholdings. The Meditation school had spread in the closing days of Silla, and also predominated in Koryeo because of its simple message of meditation and reliance on sudden enlightenment. The impoverished peasant found it the major source of consolation. In the closing years of Koryeo, however, new interest grew in Neo-Confucianism.

⁶⁶ See Lee (1984: 133-4, 166).

The spread of Neo-Confucianism, however, gave rise to open attacks on the abuses of the temples and monks.

⁶⁷ See Lee (1984: 116-8).

高麗史 卷第八十一 志 第三十五
兵一 太祖...置六衛 衛有三十八領
領各千人...唐府衛之制矣 恭讓王元
年 [1389] 府兵領於八衛...四十二都
府之兵十有二萬...禁衛禦外侮也 自
事元以來...文恬武嬉 禁衛無人...遼
金氏...莫敢旁窺...以祖宗之軍政...我
國百姓有事則爲軍...故軍民一致

A supreme (上) or great (大) general commanded the Two Guards (二軍/鷹揚軍, 龍虎軍) and Six Divisions (六衛/左右衛, 神虎衛, 興威衛, 金吾衛, 千牛衛, 監門衛). The regiment (領) was commanded by a general.

⁶⁸ 高麗史 卷第八十一 志 第三十五
兵制 定宗二年 [947] 以契丹將侵
還軍三十萬號光軍置光軍司
靖宗八年 [1041] 判國子監諸業學生
年壯不成才者充光軍

In 1041, the students who performed poorly in the National Academy (國子監) were transferred to the Lightening Army.

⁶⁹ See Henthorn (1971: 96).

高麗史節要 乙酉八年 十二月 [925]
契丹滅渤海 渤海本粟末靺鞨也 唐
武后時 高句麗人大祚榮走保遼東
睿宗封爲渤海郡王 因自稱渤海國
併有扶餘肅慎等十餘國..而與契丹世
讎 契丹主大舉攻渤海圍忽汗城滅之
改爲東丹國 其世子大光顯 及將軍
申德 禮部卿大和均 均老司政大元
均 工部卿大福譽 左右衛將軍大審
理 小將冒豆干 檢校開國男朴漁 工
部卿吳興等 率其餘衆 前後來奔者
數萬戶 王待之甚厚 賜光顯姓名王
繼 附之宗籍 使奉其祀 僚佐皆賜爵

occasion. The troops served for the duration of the crisis.” This Koryeo military machine proved to have been powerful enough to defend against a series of massive Qidan invasions.

Wang Keon regarded himself as the successor to the Koguryeo dynasty. The irredentist spirit of the founder of the Koryeo dynasty was evident in the very name, Koryeo, a shortened form of Koguryeo. In fact, many Chinese dynastic chronicles, as well as the *Kojiki* and *Nibongi*, had always referred to Koguryeo as Koryeo. Wang Keon welcomed the ruling class and the last crown prince of the Parhae dynasty that was destroyed by the Qidan Liao. More than fifty thousand Parhae people took refuge in Koryeo, and the crown prince was officially included in the Koryeo royal clan. The influx of Parhae refugees, including officials, artisans, and peasants, continued throughout the tenth century. Most Nüzhen tribes had been under Parhae rule, but when Parhae was destroyed by the Qidan, they looked upon Koryeo as the suzerain power. Some Mohe-Nüzhen tribes of Parhae moved into the Ham-heung plain in the Korean northeast and also into the Yalu River area. The Koryeo court gave them land and dwellings, thus furnishing them with the means to maintain their livelihood.⁶⁹

KORYEO FIGHTS AGAINST QIDAN-XIANBEI LIAO

Wang Keon, the founder of Koryeo, had left behind for his successors the Ten Injunctions, of which Article 5 commanded the later kings to reside more than 100 days a year in the Western Capital (Pyung-yang). Article 4 commanded the later kings to avoid the ignobility of copying the Tang tradition that had been cherished in old days, and never to imitate the barbarous Qidan tradition, either. In October 942, the Qidan envoys brought a gift of fifty camels, but Wang Keon, angry at the destruction of Parhae in 926 by the Qidan, banished the thirty Qidan envoys to an island and let the camels starve to death. As Abaoji had styled himself emperor in 916, Kwang-jong (r.949-75) of Koryeo also styled himself emperor by calling Kae-seong the “Imperial Capital” in 960.⁷⁰

Ledyard (1983: 323) notes that “As the self-proclaimed successor to Koguryeo ... Koryeo considered the northern territories in Manchuria its rightful legacy. The Qidans, as conquerors of Bohai ... obviously had other ideas. Koryeo was

ultimately successful in laying claim to and holding the old Bohai lands south of the lower Yalu, which were the bone of contention in a series of Koryeo-Liao wars lasting from 993 to 1018.”

In 993, Liao had sent an invasion force, claimed to number 800,000, across the Yalu under Xiao Sun'ning, viceroy of the Liao Eastern Capital. Xiao had identified the Koryeo with Silla and the Liao with Koguryeo, and demanded the cession to Liao of the former Koguryeo territories both south and north of the Yalu. Through the diplomatic maneuvers of Seo Hui, however, Koryeo was able to persuade the Qidan army to withdraw voluntarily. The Qidan ostensibly could not deny Seo Hui's assertion that Koryeo was the successor to Koguryeo and thus could lay claim to the territories on both sides of the Yalu formerly under Koguryeo dominion, including the Liao's Eastern Capital. In fact, the Qidans were engaged in a battle against the Northern Song at that time, and hence were unable to bring their full strength to bear on Koryeo. The Qidan Liao, and later the Nüzhen Jin, avoided engagements on both mainland China and the Korean Peninsula fronts simultaneously.⁷¹

After concluding the Shanyuan peace treaty with the Song in 1005, the Liao launched full-scale campaigns against Koryeo, beginning in 1010 and lasting for about ten years, but they gained no real success.

The Liao army of 400,000 men, led by Emperor Shengzong (r.982-1031) himself, invaded Koryeo in November 1010 and captured the capital by January 1, 1011. Koryeo mobilized 300,000 soldiers. Fearing that their supply lines might be cut, the Qidan suddenly withdrew without gaining any particular advantage. In 1014-5, Koryeo was attacked by *ordo* army and well-trained tribal troops selected from the Supreme and the Central Capital area.⁷² There were attacks on Koryeo in 1016 and 1017. The Qidan invaded again in December 1018, this time with a 100,000-man army led by Xiao Baiya, but virtually the entire army was annihilated at Kui-ju in February 1019 by the 208,300-man Koryeo army led by Kang Kam-chan. Xiao Baiya was stripped of all his titles and offices, and disgraced.⁷³

BIRTH OF THE “RESPECT THE GREATER” (YIELD TO THE STRONGER) STRATEGY IN THE KOREAN PENINSULA

Every Qidan invasion of Koryeo ended in failure, but in

According to Lee (1984: 126), “It was Koryeo that supplied their needs of grain, cloth, iron agricultural implements, and iron weapons, for which they exchanged horses and furs. There were many Nüzhen who remained in their original places of abode and yet put their trust in Koryeo.”

⁷⁰ 高麗史節要 癸卯二十六年 (943) 王...召...親授訓要...其一曰 我國家大業 必資諸佛護衛之力 故創禪教寺院...其三曰 凡元子不肖者與其次子 次于皆不肖者 與其兄弟之中群下推戴者繼承大統 其四曰 惟我東方 舊慕唐風 文物禮樂 悉導其制 殊方異土 人性各異 不必苟同 契丹是禽獸之國 風俗不同 言語亦異 衣冠制度 慎勿效焉 其五曰...西京水德調順為我國地脈之根本 宜當四仲巡 駐留過百日 以致安寧

Wang Keon had strong reservations about the Chinese tradition of requiring the eldest son to take the throne. In good Altaic fashion, Article 3 clearly commanded the choice of the most capable heir by saying that when the eldest son is unworthy, a younger son should be chosen; and when all the younger sons are unworthy, one of the brothers may ascend the throne.

高麗史節要 壬寅二十五年 [942] 冬十月 契丹遣使來歸橐駝五十四 王以契丹 嘗與渤海連和 忽生疑貳 不顧舊盟 一朝殄滅 此為無道之甚 不足遠結為隣 絕其交聘 流其使三十人于海島 繫橐駝萬夫橋下 皆餓死 高麗史節要 庚申十一年 (960)...以開京為皇都西京為西都

⁷¹ Rogers (1983: 155) notes: "Xiao ... complained that Koryeo, despite its proximity to Liao, 'crossed the sea to serve Song.'... Seo Hui ...[argued] that hostile Nüzhen tribes in the Yalu region prevented similar relations with the Liao. If Koryeo were permitted to establish forts in strategic locations to control the Nüzhens it would seek to cultivate relations with Liao." Koryeo thereby obtained the Qidan's consent to build forts in the area up to the Yalu as a means to regulate the Nüzhens.

高麗史節要 癸巳十二年 [993] 冬十月 蕭遜寧...書云八十萬兵...語熙曰汝國與新羅地 高句麗之地我所有也而汝侵蝕之 又與我連壤 而越海事宋大國 是以來討 今割地以獻 而修朝聘 可無事矣 熙曰 非也 我國則高句麗之舊也 故號高麗 都平壤 若論地界 上國之東京 皆在我境 何得謂之侵蝕乎 且鴨綠江內外亦我境內 今女真盜據 其間頑黠變詐道途梗澁 甚於涉海 朝聘之不通 女真之故也 若今逐女真 還我舊地 築城堡通道路 則敢不修聘...熙復奏曰臣與遜寧 若盪平女真 收復舊地 然後朝觀可通 今...收江內請俟得江外 修聘未晚

The Nüzhens and Koreans, notes Standen (2007: 94), "sought advantage from the Liao-Song rivalry ... Both sought Song military help...but Zhao Kuangyi [Taizong] was unwilling to upset the peace [in 994]... Accordingly the Nüzhens were forced to reaffirm their allegiance to Liao, and the Koreans deepened their relationship, even receiving a royal bride from the Liao consort house [蕭恒德女 in 995]."

February 1020 the Koryeo court, keeping its cis-Yalu territory, promised to abandon its hostile stance against Qidan (as an inferior state paying tributes 稱藩納貢) and to break its relations with the Song. Thenceforth their relationship was peaceful. The Koryeo was never defeated in war against the Qidan. After experiencing the repeated ravages of warfare, however, the Koryeo rulers learned the wisdom of the "Respect-the-Greater" or "Yield-to-Stronger" strategy. They decided to make peace with the Qidan-Xianbei Liao state and avoid any further futile destruction. When the Nüzhen Jin appeared later as the new "Stronger," never mind whether they were barbarous nomads or primitive woodsmen, the Koryeo readily accepted the suzerain-subject formality without mounting a single battle.

The military machine that had enabled the peninsular kindoms to cope with the gigantic scale invasions from the Sui, Tang, and Liao gradually became ineffective through negligence. Although the Koryeo managed to resist the Mongol invasions for 30 years (1231-59), the military machine became completely non-functional by the time the Chosun people faced the invasions of the Japanese (1592-8) and later the Manchus (in 1627 and 1636).

The Yalu River has ever since been the definitive northern frontier for the peninsular Yemaek cousins. The Yemaek Tungus in Manchuria, who had already gone through the process of forming the Marco-Tungus under Koguryeo (after c.400) and Parhae (698-926), began the process of becoming an integral part of the greater (Xianbei-Tungus) Manchurian people under the Liao, Jin, Yuan, and Qing that came to occupy the whole of Manchuria.

The Song and the Koryeo maintained rather irregular relations with each other, partly because of the reservations harbored by the Song about the Koryeo. Not only Koguryeo, Paekche, and Silla, but also Koryeo were hereditary aristocratic societies headed by a king who had promoted Buddhist doctrine, unagreeable to the Neo-Confucian literati of the Song court. According to Ledyard (1983: 347), "a substantial body of Song opinion, led by Su Dongpo (Su Shi 蘇軾/東坡 1036-1101), still considered Koryeo tainted with a 'Manchurian' character that in their view utterly impaired its usefulness as an ally. But another Song group, for which Fu Pi (富弼) can serve as the spokesman, seems to have grasped the reality that Koryeo was a valid and

credible enemy of the Manchurian forces – in other words, that it was now a peninsular power defending a Chinese style of civilization against northern enemies. But Su’s views largely prevailed.” In fact, the Fu Pi’s view would be more befitting to the fanatically Neo-Confucian Chosun dynasty that replaced Koryeo.

5. Qidan’s Failure to Assimilate the Tungusic People

THE QIDAN ESTABLISH A PROTO-XIANBEI-TUNGUS STATE

The Qidan Liao were able to establish only a proto-Xianbei-Tungus state of sorts in Manchuria. Wittfogel and Fêng (1949: 195) state: the Parhae were “conquered after a violent military assault,” and they were “governed with great severity. Repeated attempts to shake off the hated Liao yoke resulted in intensified measures of repression. ... Under these circumstances the number of Parhae who became Qidan soldiers was unusually small, particularly in their old eastern homeland.” The (minimum) estimated Parhae population at the close of the Liao dynasty was 550,000 persons including 220,000 adult males. Only about of 18% (40,000 persons) of Parhae adult males were included in the *ordos*, while more than 40% of adult males of the Qidan and other non-Parhae tribes were mobilized as the *ordos* (ibid: 56-8).

The Parhae court capitulated in the first month of the year 926, but a part of the population rebelled in the third and in the seventh month. The Qidan rulers ruthlessly carried out mass deportation and treated the remaining population with great suspicion. A serious revolt directed by a Parhae general occurred in the year 975. The movement was defeated, but the Liao army did not manage to capture the Parhae general.⁷⁴ There was the great Parhae Rebellion in 1029-30 that was led by a descendant of the Parhae royal family who was an army commander at the Eastern Capital (東京遼陽). In 1116, the hated Qidan viceroy was murdered, and a Parhae officer declared himself emperor of a new state at the Eastern Capital that was later destroyed by the Aguda’s Nüzhen army. Many refugees fled into Koryeo.⁷⁵

When the Qidans conquered Parhae, the Blackwater-Mohe tribes that could be incorporated into the Liao state were called the Tamed Nüzhen, and the rest of the tribes were called the Wild Nüzhen who inhabited the so-called “White Mountains,

⁷² Wittfogel and Fêng (1949: 520)

Franke (1994: 219) notes that, when the Qidans waged a campaign against Koryeo in 1010, “the Nüzhen took the Korean side. The Qidans suffered a heavy defeat and retreated. But for the Nüzhen, this victory of their Korean ally had the result that their emissaries for quite some time thereafter reached Song China only as members of Korean embassies.”

⁷³ Twitchett and Tietze (1994: 112)

高麗史 世家第四 顯宗元年 [1010] 十月...以...康兆...率兵三十萬軍于通州以備契丹...契丹主 自將步騎四十萬渡鴨綠江

遼史 卷八十八 列傳第十八 蕭排押尚衛國公主 拜駙馬都尉...遷東京留守...復攻宋...專任南面事 宋和議成爲北部宰相...再伐高麗 至開京...而還 渡茶陀二河 敵來射 排押委甲仗走 坐是免冠...弟恒德 字遜寧...尚越國公主 拜駙馬都尉...爲東京留守...至高麗北鄙 比還 道遠糧絕 士馬死傷者衆 坐是削功臣號

⁷⁴ See Wittfogel and Fêng (1949: 405).

“The Parhae were...not permitted to play their national game of polo [until 1038] because it offered an opportunity for military training (ibid: 195).”

遼史 卷八十一 列傳第十一 蕭孝忠 重熙七年...時禁渤海人擊毬 孝忠言「..若非毬馬 何以習武 且天子以四海爲家 何分彼此 宜弛其禁」從之

⁷⁵ Twitchett and Tietze (1994: 113, 144)

遼史 卷三十 本紀 第二十八 天祚皇帝二 天慶五年 [1115] 下詔親征...女直軍陷黃龍府..女直主聚衆...曰..蓋苦契丹殘忍... 遣駙馬蕭...將騎兵五萬 步卒四十萬 親軍七十萬... 東京故渤海地 太祖力戰二十餘年乃得之 而...嚴酷 渤海苦之...高永昌僭號...阿骨打...即位皇帝

⁷⁶ 金史 卷一 本紀 第一 世紀 金之先 出靺鞨氏 靺鞨本號勿吉 古肅慎地也 元魏時勿吉有七部 曰粟末部... 曰黑水部...唐初有黑水靺鞨粟末靺鞨 其五部無聞 粟末靺鞨始附高麗... 其後渤海盛強 黑水役屬之... 五代時契丹盡取渤海地 而黑水靺鞨附屬於契丹 其在南者 籍契丹號熟女直 其在北者 不在契丹籍 號生女直 生女直地有...長白山...黑龍江

The *Qidan-guozhi* reads: “the [Chinese people of] Liaodong used to be at odds with the Nüzhen and Bohai.” The *Liaoshi* reads: “Bohai, Nüzhen, and Chinese nationals were settled in the fortified border cities of the northwest.” Wittfogel and Fêng (1949: 197, 522)

新五代史 卷七十二 四夷附錄第一 契丹...有窺中國之志 患女真渤海等在其後 欲擊渤海

舊五代史 卷三十四 唐書十 莊宗紀 第八 同光四年[926]契丹寇女真渤海 遼史 卷一百三 列傳第三十三 文學上 重熙四年 沉渤海女直高麗合從 連衡不時征討 遼史 卷二十八 本紀第二十八 天祚皇帝 天慶六年 春州渤海二千餘戶 叛 七年 女直軍攻春州...渤海人皆降

Black Water” area. The Chinese chronicles give the Parhae state and its people a separate identity from the Nüzhen tribes (女直). The Parhae (Bohai) people in those chronicles therefore seem to include only the Koguryeo and the Sumo-Mohe (粟末靺鞨) people who had originally founded Parhae, while the Nüzhens include all the rest of the Mohe-Nüzhen tribes.⁷⁶

The Nüzhen tribes that had been settled in the Liao basin were thoroughly detribalized. Those in the farther north in eastern Jilin province, Twitchett and Tietze (1994: 141) write, “were considered a subordinate nation and had close and regular contact with the [Liao] court. But by far the largest and most significant group were the Wild Nüzhen, who inhabited the middle and lower valley of the Songhua and the eastern mountains of Heilungjiang. Although they were nominally vassals of the Liao court, they were subject to no real control.”

In 986, according to Wittfogel and Fêng (1949: 528), “the [Liao] empire’s highest official, the northern chancellor, led an army against the Nüzhen. The extensive booty seized, one hundred thousand captives and two hundred thousand horses, suggests the strength of the attacking Liao forces.” The Liao army launched another punitive attack on the Wild Nüzhens in 1026, capturing a large number of men, horses, cows, and pigs.⁷⁷ The incessant rebellions waged by the Tungusic people drained the energy of the Liao, perhaps accounting for the inability of the Qidans to conquer the area south of the Sixteen Prefectures.

After conquering the Tungusic people, the Qidan-Xianbei had never systematically attempted to co-opt them for empire building. Consequently, their conquest performance in North China was much less impressive than the Murong-Xianbei or Tuoba-Xianbei conquest dynasties that simply chose to coexist with the macro-Tungusic Koguryeo. Neither could the Nüzhen Jin, destroyer of the Qidan Liao dynasty, successfully co-opt the Qidan. Therefore they were able to occupy only North China. The Mongols, however, could thoroughly assimilate the Qidans and co-opt the Turks to realize a pax-Mongolica. The Manchus absorbed the entire macro-Tungus in Manchuria, and were able to co-opt and mobilize the Mongols of Inner Mongolia that included the Mongolianized Qidans, realizing a pax-Manjurica.

The original core of the Qidan native territory was located in the basin of Xilamulun. When the Yuan rulers fled to

the Mongolian steppe in 1368, some Mongol tribes came to occupy the Xilamulun region, absorbing the native Qidan tribes there. The Qidan seem to have become extinct as a separate population by the end of the Yuan period.⁷⁸

Appendix 9.1. The Western Liao Dynasty (1124-1211/1213/1218)

In January 1122, the Nüzhen Jin army captured the Liao Central Capital, and in March the last Liao emperor, Tianzuo (天祚帝 r.1101-25), fled from the Southern Capital (燕). Yelü Dashi (耶律大石 b.1087/r.1124-43), an eighth-generation descendant of Abaoji and the chief of military affairs in Liao's final days, together with other Liao dignitaries, acclaimed Yelü Chun (淳) emperor at the Southern Capital. The Jin army captured the Western Capital in April; Chun died of illness; and his widow, Empress Xiao Defei (蕭德妃), was made regent. She took over the military and civil governance in June 1122 and, personally commanding the Qidan and Xia soldiers, routed the huge Song army from the south. The empress regent was executed by Tianzuo, the last living Liao emperor, in February 1123.

The Jin army captured the Southern Capital in May 1124; Yelü Dashi left for Mongolia in July; and Tianzuo was captured by the Nüzhen army in February 1125.⁷⁹ Dashi established his headquarters at Kedun (Zhenzhou), the former Qidan military and administrative center of the Orkhon River region, collecting the 20,000-man Qidan tribal garrison forces and more than 10,000 pre-Chinggis (Jajirad, Dila and Naiman) Mongol tribes.⁸⁰ Among the “eighteen tribes” in the area, we find the Dahuang (big yellow) Shiwei tribe that was, according to Biran (2005: 28), “a branch of the Shiwei confederation, from which the Mongols later emerged. Although originally residing in Manchuria, by later Liao times they were part of its northwestern route.”⁸¹

Yelü Dashi was 38 years old when he enthroned himself as the first emperor of Western Liao (Qara Khitai/Black Qidan) in 1124. Dashi recognized his inability to challenge the Jin Empire and also the relative weakness of the central Asian kingdoms. Dashi led his army westward in search of new territories, hoping to return some day to restore the Liao dynasty.⁸²

Dashi was joined by Turkic tribes that enlarged his force

Western Liao (Qara Khitai; Black Qidan)

⁷⁷ 遼史 卷十一 本紀 第十一 聖宗二 統和四年... 討女直所獲生口十萬餘 馬二十餘萬 及諸物
遼史 卷十七 本紀 第十七 聖宗八 太平六年... 入女直界 俘獲人馬牛豕 不可勝計

Mote (1999: 120) quotes the Aguda's lament: “From the beginnings of our uprising we have all borne together the cruelties inflicted by the Qidans ...”

⁷⁸ See Janhunen (1996: 145).



9.1. Western Liao (1124-1213)

⁷⁹ See Biran (2005: 146-7) and Mote (1999: 202-3, 205).

遼史 卷二十九 本紀 第二十九 天祚皇帝三 保大二年 [1122] 正月 金克中京...三月...上聞...入...謾立淳...從之...四月...金已取西京...六月...淳死 衆乃議立其妻蕭氏爲皇太后 主軍國事...三年...二月...誅蕭德妃...四年 金人既克燕...七月...大石...自立爲王 率所部西去

遼史 卷三十 本紀 第三十 天祚皇帝四 耶律大石者 世號爲西遼...太祖八代孫也...登天慶五年[1115] 進士第 擢翰林應奉...保大二年[1122] 金兵日逼 天祚播越...淳爲帝..淳死..立其妻..爲太后 以守燕...大石不自安...自立爲主 率...至可敦城 駐北庭都護

府會...七州及大黃室韋...十八部王衆...諭曰...復我疆宇...遂得精兵萬餘...明年兵行萬里...軍勢日盛...至...西域...回回國王來降...立大石爲帝...年三十八...改元延慶[1124-33]...冊元妃蕭氏爲昭德皇后...曰 朕與卿等行三萬里...康國元年[1134-43]...率七萬騎東征...曰 我大遼自太祖 太宗艱難而成帝業...期復大業...行萬餘里無所得...勤兵而還...康國十年沒...廟號德宗...子夷列年幼 遺命皇后權國...感天皇后[蕭塔不烟] 稱制改元咸清[1144-50] 在位七年 子夷列即位 改元紹興[1151-63]...得八萬四千五百戶 在位十三年沒 廟號仁宗子幼 遺詔以妹[耶律普速完]...權國稱制 改元崇福[1164-77] 號承天太后..在位十四年 [夷列]次子[耶律直魯古/末主]..即位 改元天禧[1178-1211] 在位三十四年..乃蠻王屈出律...而據其位 遂襲遼衣冠...死 遼絕 [d.1213]

⁸⁰ According to Biran (2005: 27), Kedun was established in 1004 after a successful expedition by the Liao army, and was the most important Liao garrison on the Orkhon River. See also Twitchett and Tietze (1994: 150-3).

⁸¹ Several others among them were also from Manchuria.

⁸² See Biran (2005: 1, 146).

⁸³ Biran (2005: 143) states: “Even before the immigration of the Qara Khitai into Central Asia, the Khitans, who ... spoke a para-Mongolic language, were enumerated among the Turkic tribes by Muslim authors.”

to 40,000 households. According to Biran (2005: 146), “after the conquest of Balāsāghūn...10,000 Qidans, who had already arrived in the west before the immigration of the Qara Khitai and were formerly subjects of the Western Qarakhanid, also joined the Dashi.”⁸³ The expedition in March 1134 to restore the Liao dynasty, however, ended in failure.

Yelü Dashi subjugated the Uighur Turks at Hami and Turfan, and established a foothold in Transoxania. He gradually conquered the whole area between the Oxus River in the west and the Altai Mountains in the east, establishing a Central Asiatic empire known to the Chinese the Xi Liao and to the Muslims as the Black Qidans, “because it adopted black for symbolic and ritual purposes,” notes Mote (1999: 206). Western Liao, with its capital at the old city of Belasaghun on the Chu River near the lake Issyk-kul, came to occupy the Muslim Turkestan south of the Lake Balkhash, extending from Hami to the Aral Sea and including Samarkand, Bukhara, Balkh, Kashgar, Khotan, Besh Balikh, Talas, and Tashkent. “In size the Xi Liao state is” in the words of Wittfogel and Feng (1949: 659), “comparable to its two great contemporaries in the Far East, Jin and Southern Song.” The arrival of these rather Mongolic Qidan tribes to subjugate Turkic nomads of Central Asia presaged, by a hundred years, the arrival of the pure-blooded Chinggis Khanite Mongols themselves.

The Western Liao army retained the decimal organization in multiples of hundreds, thousands, and tens of thousands. Biran (2005: 148-9) states: “The minimal age for enrollment in the Qara Khitai army was eighteen years... [N]o permanent Qara Khitai forces were stationed in the conquered territories. The standing army ... was salaried. ... The paid army enabled the Gürk-han (葛兒罕 *Geer-han*, Universal Khan) to enforce strict discipline among his troops ... and ... to forbid the pillage of its subject territories.” The army commanders were noble Qidans belonging to either the Yelü clan or the consort clan, the Xiao. The standing army numbered 80,000-100,000 men cavalry forces, reinforced by the auxiliary armies of the subject kingdoms and other Turkic tribes. The Gürk-hans did not allocate appanages to their commanders (ibid: 153).

“Since most of the sedentary population of the Qara Khitai was included not in their central territory but in the

subordinate kingdoms,” says Biran (2005: 114), there was no need for the dual government system and the Liao-style Southern Administration. The Black Qidan court was organized in the fashion of the Liao Northern Administration, and the “officials were generally described as amīr (military commanders), a designation which emphasizes their military roles (ibid: 109).”

According to Biran (2005: 114), only the “principle that guided the adoption of the dual administration in Liao times: ‘Ruling according to what is common [in each region] brings best results’ was continued and is apparent especially in the administration of the subject territories.” Consequently, the Qidans rarely intervened in their vassals’ internal affairs.⁸⁴ According to Wittfogel and Fêng (1949: 666-7), the Western Liao had emphasized the spirit of “cooperation” and hence stationed no Qidan army in a vassal state, though the overlordship was real.

Wittfogel and Fêng (1949: 3) state: “Liao culture was directly perpetuated in the state of Qarāra-Khitāy,” and Black Qidan ruled “by virtue of a political organization which impressed contemporary writers with its power and statesmanship.” The Black Qidans, says Biran (2005: 172), “did not embrace Islam ... [and] continued to adhere to the Qidan tribal religion as well as to Buddhism.” Wittfogel and Fêng (ibid: 671) state that “Buddhism, the ‘civilized’ concomitant of Qidan shamanism during the Liao period, maintained its popularity among the Qara Khitai until the end of the dynasty.”⁸⁵

The Western Liao throne (Zhilugu 直魯古/末主 r.1178-1211) was usurped in 1211 by the Naiman prince Güchülüg (r.1211-18) who, Wittfogel and Feng (1949: 652) note, “adopted the dress and customs of Western Liao and made Zhilugu the imperial father and his wife the empress dowager.”⁸⁶ The last emperor of Western Liao, Zhilugu, died in 1213. Chinggis Khan ordered the Mongol general Djebe to attack Güchülüg in 1216. Güchülüg fled westward, but was captured by the Mongol general in 1218 with the aid of a former attendant of Zhilugu and was executed. When Qara Khitai was conquered by Chinggis Khan, most of the Black Qidans in the west, just like the Qidans in the east, joined the Mongols.⁸⁷

⁸⁴ The main obligation of the non-Qidan subject rulers was the payment of tax in the form of annual tribute, in addition to the occasional military obligation. The conquered sedentary population usually did not bear arms (ibid: 116-7 and 150).

⁸⁵ Wittfogel and Feng (1949) note: “the Buddhist monk who bore the title of grand preceptor, a mark of distinction under the Liao dynasty, was...equally honored by the Xi Liao (ibid: 665) ... The Naiman chief, Güchülüg, who had been a Christian, adopted Buddhism after marrying a Qara Khitai girl. ... [T]he Qara Khitai never adopted the religion of Islam (ibid: 671).”

⁸⁶ According to Wittfogel and Feng (1949: 650-1), Chinggis Khan defeated the Merkits at the Irtysh River in 1208, and Güchülüg (屈出律), who had taken refuge there, fled to Western Liao. The Uighur king, hearing of Chinggis Khan's prestige, killed the state supervisor installed by the Western Liao and submitted to the Mongols in 1209.

⁸⁷ See Biran (2005: 2, 201). Grousset (1970: 186) notes that several Qidan clans made a further westward migration to the Ural and Volga regions, joining the ruling class of the Kipchak Turks, the masters of the Russian steppe, by the middle of the eleventh century.

Chapter 10 begins at 295.